Changing the Marriage Equation by Widiss, Deborah A.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2012
Changing the Marriage Equation
Deborah A. Widiss
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, dwidiss@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Family Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Widiss, Deborah A., "Changing the Marriage Equation" (2012). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 501.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/501
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
721 
Washington University 
Law Review 
 
VOLUME 89 NUMBER 4 2012   
 
CHANGING THE MARRIAGE EQUATION 
DEBORAH A. WIDISS
 
ABSTRACT 
This Article brings together legal, historical, and social science 
research to analyze how couples allocate income-producing and domestic 
responsibilities. It develops a framework—what I call the “marriage 
equation”—that shows how sex-based classifications, (non-sex-specific) 
substantive marriage law, and gender norms interrelate to shape these 
choices. The marriage equation has changed over time, both reflecting 
and engendering societal preferences regarding the optimal allocation of 
breadwinning and caretaking responsibilities.  
Until fifty years ago, sex-based classifications in family and 
employment law aligned with gender norms to enforce an ideology of 
separate spheres for men and women. The groundbreaking sex 
discrimination cases of the 1970s ended legal distinctions between the 
duties of husbands and wives but left largely in place both gender norms 
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and substantive rights within marriage, tax, and benefits law that 
encourage specialization into breadwinning and caregiving roles. Thus, 
contrary to popular conception, the modern marriage equation does not 
actually promote equal sharing of these responsibilities. Rather, it still 
encourages specialization, although the law is now formally agnostic 
about which spouse plays which role. The vast majority of different-sex 
couples still follow to some extent traditional gender roles. A body of 
emerging social science research suggests that same-sex couples typically 
allocate these responsibilities more equally than different-sex couples. But 
claims that same-sex couples may therefore serve as a model for different-
sex couples improperly ignore that the data sets in these studies predate 
legal marriage for same-sex couples. By permitting disaggregation of the 
marriage equation to gauge more accurately the relative significance of 
sex, gender norms, and substantive marriage law, the new reality of same-
sex marriage can serve as a natural experiment that should inform both 
study design and policy reform.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“It never ceases to amaze me how many people will say to us, ‘So, 
who’s the woman, and who’s the man, in your marriage?’” 
—Jason Shumaker, husband to Paul McLoughlin II1 
Traditionally, substantive marriage law aligned sex-based 
classifications with gender norms. They were collectively coherent and 
mutually reinforcing, albeit in a way that subordinated women to men. A 
husband was responsible for financially supporting his wife and a wife 
owed domestic services to her husband. The groundbreaking sex 
discrimination cases of the 1970s required legislatures to strip away 
virtually all of the sex-based classifications within marriage law other than 
the basic requirement that marriage must be between a man and a woman.
2
 
These decisions have a separate legacy that is often overlooked: although 
they prohibited most legal distinctions between the sexes, they left in place 
an architecture of marriage, tax, and benefits law that encourages 
specialization into breadwinner and caregiver roles.
3
 Gender norms have 
also changed far less than feminist reformers expected. Despite more than 
thirty years of formal equality, the vast majority of different-sex marriages 
still follow to some extent traditional gender roles.
4
 Contemporary 
litigation over marriage rights for same-sex couples—that is, challenges to 
the last significant sex-based classification within marriage law—once 
again reconfigures marriage. The new reality of same-sex married couples 
does not just advance equality for gays and lesbians; it can also offer a 
fresh perspective on efforts to achieve equality within marriage for 
(different- and same-sex) couples.  
Sex-based classifications within marriage law, gender norms, and non-
sex-specific substantive laws of marriage collectively form what I call a 
“marriage equation” that shapes how individual couples allocate 
responsibility for breadwinning and for caretaking. This Article explores 
the connections among these factors and the tensions that can arise when 
 
 
 1. Benoit Denizet-Lewis, Young Gay Rites, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 27, 2008, at 28, 35. 
 2. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding ban on men receiving alimony 
unconstitutional); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (holding ban on widowers receiving 
social security benefits unconstitutional). 
 3. See infra Part II.B. 
 4. See infra Part II.C. 
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they pull in different directions.
5
 All three factors of the marriage equation 
both reflect and engender societal preferences regarding the “optimal” 
division of income-producing and domestic responsibilities. Thus, the 
elements of the marriage equation can be used to encourage a particular 
allocation of these functions, anywhere along a spectrum bounded at one 
end by equal sharing by both spouses of caretaking and breadwinning 
responsibilities and at the other by total specialization into separate roles. 
Additionally, and importantly, the interrelationship of these factors is 
essential in determining whether a normative preference for specialization, 
as applied to different-sex couples, is specific or agnostic as to the sex of 
the spouse who plays each role.  
This Article traces the evolution of the marriage equation over the past 
fifty years to show how its factors interrelate in the choices individual 
couples make and in the development of public policy. It demonstrates 
how assumed or presumed connections between sex-based classifications 
and gender norms shape legislative and judicial responses to debates over 
marriage policy. The analysis in this Article helps show why reform of 
sex-based classifications alone can have little (or arguably even harmful) 
effect when not accompanied by corresponding changes in substantive 
marriage responsibilities and gender norms.
6
 In other words, the marriage 
equation framework serves as a diagnostic tool that helps analyze 
successes and limits of past reforms and that identifies crucial questions 
that should shape research and policy design in the future.  
The framework also helps explain why and how conversations 
regarding proposed recognition of same-sex relationships often focus on 
the supposed effect that such recognition would have on gender norms for 
different-sex couples. During the 1970s, Phyllis Schlafly and other 
opponents of the Equal Rights Amendment successfully used the specter 
of gay marriage as one of the potent arguments against the amendment.
7
 
Likewise, in today’s debate, significant opposition to permitting same-sex 
couples to marry rests not simply on a definitional understanding of 
marriage as a union of man and woman but on a “thicker” gendered 
conception of marriage as ideally between a provider husband and a 
homemaker wife. Some critics explicitly call for a return to state-
sanctioned gender roles within marriage; others, who do not go that far, 
 
 
 5. This framework is sketched out in Part I. Part II and Part III use it to analyze decision-
making by and policy debates regarding different-sex and same-sex couples respectively.  
 6. See infra Part II.B–D. 
 7. See PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, THE POWER OF THE POSITIVE WOMAN 89–95 (1977); infra Part 
III.A.1.  
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worry that state recognition of same-sex marriages
8
 undermines society’s 
gendered expectations of spouses, particularly men’s responsibility to their 
wives and children, or hurts children by denying them gendered role 
models within the home.
9
 Courts have proven surprisingly receptive to 
such arguments, at least when evaluating legislation under the deferential 
“rational basis” standard.10 I have argued previously—as have others—that 
the pervasiveness of sex stereotypes in the articulated rationales for 
denying same-sex couples access to marriage should be grounds for 
holding such laws to be unconstitutional sex discrimination.
11
  
This Article turns the question around, asking not whether sex equality 
doctrine developed in the context of different-sex marriages can help 
achieve marriage equality for same-sex couples, but rather how marriage 
equality for same-sex couples can inform larger questions of sex equality. 
Although contemporary proponents of expanded marriage rights shy away 
from making such claims,
12
 some earlier advocates celebrated the 
possibility that same-sex marriage could destabilize gendered 
understandings of marriage.
13
 Other commentators and advocates worried 
about the potential “co-optive” effect of traditional marriage roles on 
same-sex relationships.
14
 The current moment transforms these arguments 
 
 
 8. The term “same-sex marriage” implies that the status is in some significant way distinct from 
(different-sex) marriage. I believe this is incorrect. This Article examines how the reality of same-sex 
married couples can change our understanding of marriage generally. However, since phrases such as 
“equal access to marriage for same-sex couples” make very clunky sentences, I use the common term 
“same-sex marriage.” Cf. M. V. LEE BADGETT, WHEN GAY PEOPLE GET MARRIED: WHAT HAPPENS 
WHEN SOCIETIES LEGALIZE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 14 (2009) (making a similar point regarding 
terminology).  
 9. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 10. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he Legislature could 
rationally proceed on the common-sense premise that children will do best with a mother and father in 
the home.”); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 983 (Wash. 2006) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he 
legislature was entitled to believe that providing that only opposite-sex couples may marry will 
encourage procreation and child-rearing in a ‘traditional’ nuclear family where children tend to 
thrive.”).  
 11. See, e.g., Deborah A. Widiss et al., Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage 
Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 461 (2007); see also Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in 
Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 97 
(2005); Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights: 
A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001). 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 267–68.  
 13. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & 
SEXUALITY 9 (1991); Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, 
OUT/LOOK NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN Q., Fall 1989, at 9, reprinted with some modifications in LESBIAN 
AND GAY MARRIAGE: PRIVATE COMMITMENTS, PUBLIC CEREMONIES 13 (Suzanne Sherman ed., 
1992). 
 14. See, e.g., Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK 
NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN Q., Fall 1989, at 14, reprinted with some modifications in LESBIAN AND GAY 
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from theoretical debates into real questions being worked out by families 
across the country.
15
 Same-sex couples are permitted to marry or form 
legally recognized civil unions or domestic partnerships in a rapidly 
growing number of states and localities.
16
 The questions are therefore 
newly salient.
17
 
A burgeoning body of social science suggests that same-sex couples 
divide responsibilities for income-producing work and domestic care more 
equally and more equitably than different-sex couples.
18
 Some social 
scientists and popular writers have accordingly claimed that the growing 
acceptance of same-sex marriage can serve as a model for different-sex 
couples struggling to share responsibilities for work and for home care.
19
 
 
 
MARRIAGE, PRIVATE COMMITMENTS, PUBLIC CEREMONIES 20 (Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992); Nancy 
D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not 
“Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993). 
 15. See Press Release, Williams Inst., New Estimate of 50,000 to 80,000 Married Same-Sex 
Couples in the U.S. (Feb. 24, 2011), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/press/press-
releases/new-estimate-of-50000-to-80000-married-same-sex-couples-in-the-us (estimating in February 
2011, prior to New York legalizing same-sex marriage, that 50,000 same-sex couples had married in 
this country, an additional 30,000 same-sex couples living in America had married in other countries, 
and that an additional 85,000 same-sex couples had formed civil unions or domestic partnerships in 
this country).  
 16. As of March 2012, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington have legalized same-sex marriage, and 
California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, and Rhode Island have state laws 
providing the equivalent of spousal rights to same-sex couples within the state. See Marriage Equality 
& Other Relationship Recognition Laws, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (July 6, 2011), http://www.hrc 
.org/documents/Relationship_Recognition_Laws_Map.pdf; 2012 Wash. Ch. 3, 2011 Wa. S.B. 6239 
(effective June 7, 2012); 2012 Md. Ch. 2, 2012 Md. H.B. 438 (effective Jan. 1, 2013, or upon 
resolution of potential disputes relating to any referendums on the Act). 
 17. A few other legal commentators have explored aspects of the interplay between marriage 
rights for same-sex couples and gender roles within different-sex marriages that I discuss. See 
Katharine K. Baker, The Stories of Marriage, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1 (2010) (articulating multiple 
meanings for “marriage” and the extent to which it remains deeply gendered); Mary Anne Case, What 
Feminists Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1199 (2010) (exploring 
historical connection between efforts to achieve equality within different-sex marriages and movement 
to legalize same-sex marriage); Jane S. Schacter, The Other Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 84 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 379, 400 (2009) (using the Stoddard/Ettelbrick debate to suggest directions for future 
empirical research). Additionally, Nancy Polikoff remains an outspoken critic of marriage as an 
objective for same-sex couples, in part because of its patriarchal past and the extent to which it 
continues to encourage specialization. See NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) 
MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008). I share some of her concerns but am 
more hopeful that the new reality of marriage rights for same-sex couples may spur positive reforms 
for same- and different-sex couples.  
 18. See infra Part III.B. 
 19. See, e.g., Sondra E. Solomon et al., Money, Housework, Sex, and Conflict: Same-Sex Couples 
in Civil Unions, Those Not in Civil Unions, and Heterosexual Married Siblings, 52 SEX ROLES 561, 
572 (2005) (“[S]ame-sex couples are a model for ways of equalizing the division of housework.”); 
Lisa Belkin, The Way We Live Now: What’s Good for the Kids, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 8, 2009, at 
MM9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/08/magazine/08fob-wwln-t.html (“Heterosexual 
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But such claims consistently overlook a key factor: the studies that exist 
today use data sets that predate legal marriage for same-sex couples. This 
is significant. Numerous aspects of marriage law, and related benefits 
laws, continue to encourage specialization into breadwinner and caretaker 
roles; this is what I call the “gender” of marriage.20 Within an existing 
marriage, a wide range of policies—including tax, social security, and 
welfare benefits—reward married couples that have a significant disparity 
in their individual incomes, and access to a spouse’s employer-sponsored 
healthcare often enables one spouse to exit the paid work force. If a 
marriage dissolves, divorce law, while far from a comprehensive safety 
net, provides protection to a dependent spouse by awarding that spouse a 
share of property and income accumulated during the marriage and, in 
some instances, maintenance or alimony payments post-divorce. These 
substantive legal rights work in tandem with societal understandings of 
what “marriage” means and the personal commitment that spouses make 
to each other. In other words, to hearken back to the quotation that opened 
this Article, the substantive law of marriage and related benefits, while 
formally sex-neutral, may nonetheless encourage spouses to take on 
distinct roles of “woman” and “man” even within a same-sex relationship.  
But the marriage equation for same-sex couples is different than that 
for different-sex couples. For different-sex couples, gender norms work 
together with substantive marriage law to encourage specialization. For 
same-sex couples, by contrast, a decision to specialize into breadwinning 
or caregiving roles means that one member of the couple, at least, is going 
“against” gender norms. Same-sex marriage can thus serve as a natural 
experiment to help tease out the relative significance of the law of 
marriage, as opposed to gender, in how couples allocate responsibilities.  
It is not (yet) possible to fully compare same-sex married couples to 
different-sex married couples. The federal Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) denies same-sex couples all of the federal benefits of marriage.
21
 
Additionally, same-sex couples in several states may form civil unions but 
not actual marriages. Pending court challenges and legislative reform 
efforts suggest that the current variability may be time limited.
22
 As I have 
 
 
couples might want to pay attention to the[] results [in such studies]”); Tara Parker-Pope, Gay Unions 
Shed Light on Gender in Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2008, at F1 (“[S]ame-sex couples have a 
great deal to teach everyone else about marriage and relationships.”). 
 20. See infra Part II.B. 
 21. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
 22. See, e.g., Perry v. Brown, No. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 2328 (9th Cir. 
Feb. 7, 2012) (holding California’s constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage 
unconstitutional); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding 
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written elsewhere, as a matter of constitutional law and fundamental 
fairness, I believe that same-sex couples in any state should have the 
freedom to marry.
23
 That said, the current patchwork offers the 
opportunity to design qualitative and quantitative studies that assess the 
relative significance of state versus federal benefits of marriage and of the 
various legal frameworks employed by states. Although it is impossible to 
predict precisely what the result of such studies would be, they could offer 
a fresh perspective on long-standing debates over the role that law plays in 
the choices families make regarding division of breadwinning and 
caregiving responsibilities.  
In exploring the potential of same-sex marriage to inform other aspects 
of marriage policy, I wish to set to the side debates over whether marriage 
is a normatively desirable goal for gays and lesbians in particular or for 
families in general. In recent years, there has been a renewed discussion 
among progressive advocates and commentators about potential costs of 
the marriage equality movement.
24
 Some argue that marriage litigation 
diverts money and energy from other advocacy priorities and has inspired 
a backlash.
25
 Others argue that expansion of marriage rights (and 
particularly the extent to which advocates for same-sex couples have 
valorized aspects of traditional marriage)
26
 may undermine efforts to 
 
 
DOMA’s limitation of “marriage” or “spouse” to one man and one woman to violate the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment), appeal pending; Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding denial of federal benefits under DOMA 
unconstitutional), appeal pending; Respect for Marriage Act, H.R. 1116, 112th Cong. (2011), S. 598 
112th Cong. (2011) (bills proposing repeal of DOMA).  
 23. See generally Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375 (2010) (arguing equal access to civil marriage is constitutionally compelled 
by the fundamental rights branch of equal protection law unless states stop performing civil marriages 
entirely); Widiss et al., supra note 11 (arguing unconstitutional sex stereotypes underlie the denial of 
marriage rights to same-sex couples).  
 24. For thoughtful accounts of the progressive critiques on the marriage equality movement, see 
Suzanne A. Kim, Skeptical Marriage Equality, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 37, 42–47 (2011) (discussing 
“marriage skepticism” grounded in concerns regarding gendered history of marriage, privileging state 
regulation of intimacy, and diverting energy from achieving state recognition of diverse family forms); 
Schacter, supra note 17, at 389–93 (identifying similar themes in Paula Ettelbrick’s initial critique of 
campaign to seek marriage rights); Edward Stein, Marriage or Liberation?: Reflections on Two 
Strategies in the Struggle for Lesbian and Gay Rights and Relationship Recognition, 61 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 567 (2009) (tracing historical development of positions pro- and con-marriage initially articulated 
by Tom Stoddard and Paula Ettelbrick and concluding the strategies complement each other well). 
 25. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 339–419 (2d ed. 2008) (arguing that backlash to litigation seeking same-sex marriage rights 
led to widespread enactment of federal and state DOMAs, contributed to the victory of George W. 
Bush, and failed to increase substantially public support for same-sex marriage). But see Scott L. 
Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235 (2010) 
(discussing such critiques before ultimately arguing they are unwarranted).  
 26. See POLIKOFF, supra note 17, at 98–103.  
  
 
 
 
 
2012] MARRIAGE EQUATION 729 
 
 
 
 
achieve recognition of diverse family structures,
27
 protection of individual 
liberties both within and outside of legally recognized relationships,
28
 or a 
more robust government commitment to meet basic needs such as access 
to health care or financial support for children.
29
 I have considerable 
sympathy for some of these critiques. Nonetheless, I believe that so long 
as civil marriage exists, it should be available to gays and lesbians.
30
 
Additionally, for better or worse, marriage is currently the primary means 
of structuring and recognizing family relationships. Tens of thousands of 
same-sex couples are now married, and this reality offers the opportunity 
to rethink aspects of marriage law more generally.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the marriage 
equation framework and its traditional alignment. Applying this 
framework, Part II shows that simply removing sex-based classifications 
from marriage law, as required by constitutional doctrine developed 
during the 1970s, has had limited effects in changing how different-sex 
couples apportion responsibility for breadwinning and caregiving. It posits 
that the prevalence and persistence of gendered divisions of 
responsibilities is due both to social norms and to substantive provisions of 
marriage and related benefits law that continue to encourage 
specialization. Part III explores a body of sociological research that 
substantiates that same-sex couples share income-producing and domestic 
responsibilities more equally than different-sex couples but argues that 
new studies should specifically explore the effects of marriage on couples’ 
decision-making. The Conclusion briefly considers how the framework 
can inform efforts to achieve equality within marriage for all couples.  
 
 
 27. See, e.g., id. at 123–45 (advocating recognition of families based on commitments to support 
or autonomous choices rather than marital default); cf. Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: 
Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385 (arguing 
family law should recognize role of non-parental caregivers); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends With 
Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007) (arguing law should recognize care provided and received by 
friends).  
 28. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Commentary, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. 
Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004) (criticizing pursuit of marriage equality as limiting freedom 
of gays and lesbians).  
 29. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should Read Martha Fineman, 8 
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 167 (2000) (building on Fineman’s proposal of replacing marriage 
with a Mother-Child dyad to argue against the gay and lesbian advocacy movement’s focus on 
marriage); see also MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) [hereinafter FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER].  
 30. See sources cited supra note 23.  
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I. INTERRELATIONSHIP OF SEX, GENDER, AND THE LAW OF MARRIAGE  
A. The Marriage Equation 
Marriage is a legal structure that traditionally has been understood to 
simultaneously regulate the family and provide significant social and 
communal benefits.
31
 The state sets rules regarding who may enter (civil) 
marriages, whether and how marriages may be dissolved, and what 
responsibilities spouses owe to each other—and to their children—during 
and after a marriage. Many of these rules seek to ensure children will 
receive physical care, education, and financial support, and additionally 
that familial caregivers for children receive financial support.
32
 But law is 
only part of the story. Marriage, more than most other legal relationships, 
has long been defined as well by societal and cultural expectations and 
religious doctrine, as well as by individual preferences.
33
 And, since many 
societies have traditionally limited marriage to the union of one man with 
one woman, regulation of marriage is intimately intertwined with 
expectations regarding appropriate male and female roles.
34
  
When married couples make decisions regarding how they will share 
responsibility for income-producing work and domestic obligations, their 
choices will generally fall on a spectrum bounded at one end by equal 
sharing of both responsibilities and at the other by complete specialization 
into breadwinning and domestic roles. Even if both spouses participate in 
the labor market, and even if they rely on paid caregivers or other 
domestic workers to support this work, couples must determine what 
extent of domestic obligations to “out-source,” which spouse will perform 
remaining domestic work, and which spouse will modify a work schedule 
 
 
 31. See, e.g., Harry D. Krause, Marriage for the New Millennium: Heterosexual, Same Sex—or 
Not at All?, 34 FAM. L.Q. 271, 276–77 (2000) (identifying social functions of marriage as providing 
“efficient and orderly setting” for sexual activity and procreation, social companionship and 
psychological support, economic insurance against adversity, and support for caregiving of dependent 
children and elderly parents).  
 32. For a discussion of these issues, and a proposal to move away from marriage as the primary 
means of providing for children, see FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 29. 
 33. See generally, e.g., Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex 
Couples and the Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2009). 
 34. For a careful review of several historical examples of same-sex “marriages,” see Polikoff, 
supra note 14, at 1538–40. Polikoff argues that most of these marriages imported hierarchies that were 
similar to the traditional male-female hierarchy within different-sex marriages. See id. At points in 
history, polygamy (a marriage of a husband with more than one wife) has been common and it remains 
widespread in some parts of the world; polyandry (a marriage of a wife with more than one husband) 
has also existed but has been far less common. See ABA Section of Family Law, A White Paper: An 
Analysis of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 38 
FAM. L.Q. 339, 349–50 (2004).  
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when necessary to meet unexpected domestic needs. For many couples, 
this negotiation occurs any time a child is too sick to go to school or any 
time a major appliance breaks down. Couples who choose to specialize 
completely into separate breadwinning and caregiving roles, or to 
prioritize labor market participation by one spouse and domestic work by 
the other spouse, must also determine which spouse will take on which set 
of responsibilities. For any given couple, the choices may shift over time, 
or even vary dramatically on a daily or weekly basis. But their choices are 
shaped, and sometimes constrained, by societal gender norms and by 
substantive marriage law, including any sex-specific obligations that are 
imposed on husbands or on wives and non-sex-specific structures that can 
encourage specialization or, conversely, equal sharing of domestic and 
income-producing responsibilities.
35
 (Single individuals, and particularly 
single parents, face different challenges, in that they must figure out how 
to meet both sets of needs largely on their own. The choices faced by 
cohabiting couples are often similar to those of married couples, but, as 
discussed more fully below, the lack of a formal, legally binding 
relationship may play a significant role in how they are resolved.) 
These three factors—sex-based classifications within marriage law, 
(non-sex-specific) substantive marriage law, and gender norms—
collectively make up what I call the “marriage equation.” Although these 
factors are logically distinct, they interrelate. Any individual couple’s 
choices will be shaped by all three factors, the extent to which the factors 
reinforce or are in tension with each other, and the couple’s assessment of 
each factor’s importance. The distinct factors of the marriage equation also 
interrelate in shaping government policy. Law expresses, reflects, and 
shapes societal norms.
36
 Shifts in the law can reflect prior evolution in 
societal norms—that is, legal changes can “catch up” to societal 
changes—or legal changes can be enacted with the expectation and hope 
that they will help spur a change in societal norms.
37
 But evolution of 
 
 
 35. For empirical work assessing significance of gender norms and substantive provisions of 
marriage law, see infra Parts II and III. 
 36. See Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 
(1992) (arguing that family law expresses and engenders shared norms regarding marriage and 
parenthood); cf. Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the 
Channelling Function of Family Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133 (2007) (arguing that recent 
developments, including debates over same-sex marriage, challenge whether shared “core values” still 
exist).  
 37. Legislation is clearly affected by popular attitudes. Many argue that even when interpreting 
constitutional provisions, courts also respond to and are influenced by public opinion even if they 
sometimes move “in front” of popular consensus. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, 
  
 
 
 
 
732 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:721 
 
 
 
 
societal norms is not monolithic; some sectors of society can feel strongly 
that legal change is warranted or even overdue, while other sectors resist 
such change vehemently. As applied to marriage law, there have been 
dramatic debates over time, regarding whether there is a single “optimal” 
division of responsibilities within marriage; if so, what it is; and further, 
whether and how the law should encourage or enforce it.
38
 In this Article, I 
do not seek to establish that a particular allocation is normatively ideal 
(although I admit a preference for equal or relatively equal sharing of both 
breadwinning and domestic responsibilities by both spouses). Rather, I 
seek to articulate more clearly the interaction of the factors within the 
marriage equation, demonstrate how at points of transition—such as 
debates over the Equal Rights Amendment and marriage rights for same-
sex couples—proponents and opponents of reform strategically claim and 
disclaim these connections, and suggest that empirical work can help 
disaggregate the effects of the distinct factors.  
Before discussing this evolving terrain, it is important to clarify terms. 
In legal cases and commentary, sex and gender are often used 
interchangeably.
39
 In other disciplines, however, “sex” is used to refer to 
men and women and the physical differences between them, and “gender” 
to refer to the characteristics stereotypically associated with the different 
sexes.
40
 Following this distinction, I am using “sex” to refer to actual sex-
based classifications within laws (that is, laws that explicitly distinguish 
between men and women or husbands and wives) and “gender” to refer to 
the different roles that men and women were traditionally expected to play 
within marriage (that is, men as breadwinners and women as 
homemakers).  
It is usually clear whether a law uses an explicit sex-based 
classification; as a more general principle, however, the line between 
“sex” and “gender,” and their interaction in choices regarding labor 
allocation within a family, is often blurry.
41
 For example, consider the 
 
 
Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1323 (2006). 
 38. See infra Parts II & III. 
 39. This is in part because former-ACLU-attorney-now-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg consciously 
chose to articulate her constitutional arguments in terms of “gender” discrimination rather than “sex” 
discrimination. As an advocate she believed that her audience would be more comfortable with the 
term “gender.” See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The 
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1995). 
 40. For a more comprehensive discussion of the difference, see id. at 10–13. 
 41. Some theorists, most notably Judith Butler, challenge the underlying assumption that there is 
a substantial reality to sexual difference distinct from gendered understandings of sex. See generally 
JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990). 
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choices couples make after the birth of a child. Medical experts typically 
estimate that women need four to eight weeks to recover physically from 
vaginal childbirth (and potentially longer to recover fully from a cesarean 
section or other complications).
42
 Additionally, if a mother wishes to 
breastfeed an infant, it is optimal that she is available to nurse on demand 
for at least four weeks.
43
 These biological facts push many different-sex 
couples to prioritize the father’s income-producing work and the mother’s 
caretaking work in the period immediately after childbirth. In other words, 
the mother goes on maternity leave and the father returns quickly to work. 
To most couples, this choice seems “obvious” or “necessary.” But the 
salience of even such clear biological differences is shaped by gendered 
assumptions. To see this, imagine a mother whose work responsibilities 
can be completed via internet-based research, email, and phone. A mother 
with such a job would likely find her largely sedentary paid work far less 
physically taxing than taking care of a newborn baby. She could likely 
complete her primary work responsibilities within a week or two of the 
birth (even if she was not yet fully physically recovered). Even if she 
wanted to breastfeed the baby, she could “return” to work if she could 
telecommute and if someone else took responsibility during the mother’s 
work hours for all aspects of newborn care other than nursing. This family 
might best meet its collective needs by having the mother return 
immediately to paid work and the father take leave.
44
 But very few couples 
ever consider this option. Of course, many women’s jobs would be less 
compatible with an immediate return post-childbirth than this hypothetical 
one. The fact that most couples choose to allocate primary responsibility 
for newborn care to the mother is not surprising. My point is simply to 
highlight that even this choice, which reflects “real” biological differences, 
also reflects gender.  
The further one moves, temporally, from pregnancy, childbirth, and 
breastfeeding, the less importance biological differences between men and 
women will play in couples’ decision-making regarding the allocation of 
 
 
 42. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 & n.4 (2003). 
 43. See, e.g., RUTH A. LAWRENCE & ROBERT M. LAWRENCE, BREASTFEEDING: A GUIDE FOR 
THE MEDICAL PROFESSION 471 (6th ed. 2005) (recommending women intending to breastfeed do not 
introduce a bottle until at least four weeks because it interferes with the mother’s “milk-making 
rhythm” and may confuse the infant).  
 44. Under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act, fathers, as well as mothers, have a right to 
up to twelve weeks unpaid leave upon the birth or adoption of a child. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2006). 
As discussed more fully below, employers with fewer than fifty employees are not covered under the 
law, and some employees may not have worked the requisite amount of hours and months to be 
eligible for leave. See infra text accompanying notes 149–50. 
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responsibilities. I also note that historically, biological differences and the 
putative need to “protect” women and their childbearing role were used as 
justifications for far-reaching limitations on women’s autonomy that are 
now clearly established as baseless.
45
 Thus, while it may be that some 
differences in men’s and women’s preferences regarding the allocation of 
income-producing and caretaking work reflect, or are influenced by, 
biological or hormonal distinctions between the sexes, my analysis 
generally treats these preferences as “gender”-based distinctions within the 
marriage equation.
46
  
“Marriage” is also a complicated term. In discussing the “marriage” 
factor of the “marriage equation,” I mean primarily legal marriage and the 
legal rights and benefits that flow from it. Procedural requirements 
regarding licensing, officiants, and witnesses seek to ensure that it is clear 
when a legal marriage has been formed, and it is generally easy to identify 
laws that incorporate marital status.
47
 The analysis below demonstrates 
that many aspects of substantive marriage and related benefits law 
encourage specialization into breadwinning and caregiving roles. But 
“marriage” is far more than a bundle of legal rights. It is an open-ended, 
ideally life-long, commitment of two individuals to form a family 
together. Thus, even if law in no way encouraged individuals within a 
couple to specialize, they might nonetheless choose to develop 
complementary responsibilities in accordance with their personal 
preferences; likewise, one might express love for a spouse by 
subordinating individual interests for the benefit of the family or the 
spouse. Moreover, many individuals understand intimacy in gendered 
terms and construct gendered identities within such relationships that they 
 
 
 45. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (holding that physical differences between 
men and women and the “burdens of motherhood” justified permitting states to regulate the hours 
worked by women); cf. Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on 
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992) (arguing that 
even regulations based on “real” differences between the sexes, such as pregnancy, may be so 
intertwined with judgments about women’s roles that they should be cognizable as sex discrimination).  
 46. For a recent review of social science literature exploring the complex interactions between 
biology and socializing forces in the development of gender roles, see Sheri A. Berenbaum et al., A 
Role for Biology in Gender-Related Behavior, 64 SEX ROLES 804 (2011). Emerging research 
demonstrates that behavior can itself affect hormonal differences, such as the widely publicized study 
that found intensive fathering lowered men’s testosterone levels. See Pam Belluck, Fatherhood Cuts 
Testosterone, Study Finds, for Good of the Family, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2011, at A1. 
 47. For example, the United States General Accounting Office (renamed as the Government 
Accountability Office in 2004) has determined that there are 1,138 federal statutes that use marriage as 
a factor in determining eligibility for benefits, rights, or privileges. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT (2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf. 
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would not accept or embrace in other contexts.
48
 For different-sex couples, 
it is quite difficult, if not impossible, to disaggregate the legal from 
personal, symbolic, and social understandings of marriage. As described 
more fully in Part III.C, the variability among states’ recognition of same-
sex couples’ relationships can help tease apart some of these complexities. 
There are, of course, factors outside the marriage equation that may 
play a large role in how couples choose to allocate their responsibilities. 
The preferences, skills, and experience of each individual member of a 
couple are obviously of central importance. The extent to which the family 
would face significant economic hardship if one spouse were to drop out 
of, or minimize participation in, the paid labor force is likewise key. For 
some couples, religious doctrine is a significant factor. And in terms of 
legal rights and responsibilities, employment law is also crucial.
49
 Notably, 
all of these other factors likewise both shape and are shaped by societal 
and legal understandings of marriage—i.e., the marriage equation. My 
claim is not that the factors in the marriage equation alone will necessarily 
be dispositive for any given couple, but rather that for most couples, and 
for government policy, the factors are a highly significant part of the 
decision-making process. Understanding how the equation has changed 
over time can therefore help both analyze past reform and identify avenues 
for future research and policy development. 
B. The Traditional Equation: Aligned and Mutually Reinforcing 
Historically, sex-based classifications, gender norms, and substantive 
marriage law were collectively coherent, albeit in a way that subordinated 
women to men. The three factors of the marriage equation expressed and 
enforced as ideal a marriage in which the husband took on primary or full 
breadwinning responsibilities and the wife took on primary or full 
caretaking responsibilities. Under the doctrine of coverture, which 
survived until the mid-nineteenth century, a woman lost her legal identity 
upon marriage.
50
 Husbands bore legal responsibility for supporting their 
wives; wives legally owed their husbands services, including housework, 
 
 
 48. See Alicia Brokers Kelly, Negotiating Gender, Vulnerability and Connection in Feminism 
and Intimate Partnership Law 32–36 (Oct. 17, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) 
(gathering sources).  
 49. The analysis below explores aspects of how employment law intersects with marriage law, 
but a comprehensive consideration of the employment side of the ledger is beyond the scope of this 
project. 
 50. For a detailed history of the doctrine of coverture and its evolution in this country, see 
generally NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000). 
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childcare, and sexual services.
51
 Wives could not own property or make 
contracts individually. In many cases, wives were not even responsible for 
their own criminal actions and husbands were granted a corresponding 
authority to regulate their wives’ conduct so as not to incur liability 
themselves. Most married women did not work outside the home; if they 
did, their husbands owned their salaries.
52
 
Although the Married Women’s Property Acts and other nineteenth-
century reforms dismantled the legal fiction that women lost individual 
identity upon marriage, numerous other sex-based distinctions persisted in 
the law until the 1970s. Wives were required to take their husbands’ 
names and to follow their husbands if they moved.
53
 Upon divorce, 
dependent wives, but not husbands, could receive alimony.
54
 Under the 
tender-years doctrine, mothers were presumptively awarded custody of 
young children.
55
 Many of the distinctions in family law were putatively 
for women’s benefit, but they were accompanied by other (often sex-
neutral) provisions that dramatically limited wives’ options and authority, 
such as the title-based system of marital property that generally assigned 
ownership exclusively to the breadwinning spouse.
56
  
Employment laws reinforced the male breadwinner/female caretaker 
division of responsibilities. Women were barred from working in specific 
jobs or professions.
57
 Special “protective” labor legislation limited the 
number of hours that women, but not men, could work.
58
 And employers 
routinely paid married men more than women performing the same work, 
 
 
 51. See, e.g., Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1456 
(1992). 
 52. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 442–45 (1765); 
COTT, supra note 50, at 11–12. 
 53. See generally Suzanne A. Kim, Marital Naming/Naming Marriage: Language and Status in 
Family Law, 85 IND. L.J. 893 (2010) (detailed exploration of the history and ongoing pervasiveness of 
gendered distinctions in marital naming law and conventions). 
 54. See Norma Basch, The Emerging Legal History of Women in the United States: Property, 
Divorce, and the Constitution, 12 SIGNS 97, 106 (1986) (“Only women could receive alimony.”); Mary 
Kay Kisthardt, Re-Thinking Alimony: The AAML’s Considerations for Calculating Alimony, Spousal 
Support or Maintenance, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 61, 66–67 (2008) (discussing various 
historical justifications for alimony, including coverture and dower and as damages for husband’s 
breach of marital contract). 
 55. See Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policy-
Making: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 107, 112–13 (1987). 
 56. See, e.g., COTT, supra note 50, at 168–79. 
 57. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a Michigan law forbidding 
female bartenders unless they were the wife or daughter of a male owner). 
 58. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416–17, 423 (1908) (upholding an Oregon law 
limiting the number of hours a woman could work to ten hours per day).  
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in recognition of their presumed responsibilities to provide for a family.
59
 
(As Henry Ford explained when doubling the rate paid to married men, 
“[T]he man does the work in the shop, but his wife does the work in the 
home. The shop must pay them both.”60) Additionally, it was common for 
employers to adopt formal or informal “marriage bars” which prohibited 
the hiring and/or retention of married women.
61
 Employers also routinely 
fired women, or required them to take unpaid leave without job security, 
when they became pregnant, even if they remained physically able to 
complete their work.
62
  
Government social insurance programs, largely created during the 
1930s through 1950s, were also structured to meet the needs of the 
idealized family of a male breadwinner providing for his dependent wife 
and children.
63
 Upon death or retirement of a spouse, dependent wives, but 
not husbands, could receive social security benefits.
64
 Unemployment 
insurance provided protection for children of out-of-work fathers but not 
out-of-work mothers.
65
 These public programs were reinforced by a rapid 
growth of employer-sponsored benefits that likewise were structured to 
meet the needs of the male breadwinner/female caretaker families. Thus, 
for example, health insurance benefits were typically made available to an 
employee and to his wife and children. Pension benefits were made 
 
 
 59. See, e.g., Allan Carlson, Rise and Fall of the American Family Wage, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 
556, 562–66 (2007).  
 60. See id. at 563 (quoting HENRY FORD, MY LIFE AND WORK 123 (1922)). 
 61. See CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN WOMEN 160–79 (1990). 
 62. See, e.g., Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of 
Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 452 (2011) (discussing how this remained common 
practice into the 1970s). 
 63. This is so familiar in this country as to seem natural, but it is important to note that some 
other countries have met these needs through programs that do not piggyback on the marital 
relationship as the presumptive primary basis for meeting the needs of dependent caretakers and 
children. See, e.g., JILL S. QUADAGNO, THE TRANSFORMATION OF OLD AGE SECURITY: CLASS AND 
POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 1–2 (1988) (contrasting the development of the 
American social security system with roughly concurrent development in many European countries of 
uniform universal pensions); cf. Jochen Clasen & Wim van Oorschot, Changing Principles in 
European Social Security, 4/2 EUR. J. OF SOC. SEC. 89 (2002) (discussing more recent evolution of 
European social security programs that incorporate elements of universalism, need-based assessment, 
and reciprocity). 
 64. Cf. URBAN INST., SOCIAL SECURITY: OUT OF STEP WITH THE MODERN FAMILY 7 (2000) 
(describing the origins of spousal benefit). For an insightful exploration of the pervasiveness of gender 
norms in the structuring of social security, see Alice Kessler-Harris, Designing Women and Old Fools: 
The Construction of the Social Security Amendments of 1939, in U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN’S HISTORY 
87 (Linda K. Kerber et al. eds., 1995).  
 65. Cf. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (making the Aid to Families with Dependant 
Children, Unemployed Father program of the Social Security Act, which previously applied only to 
fathers, apply to either parent). 
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available to an employee and to his wife and children. Employers could 
legally limit spousal benefits to female wives of male employees on the 
assumption that male spouses of female employees would (or at least 
should) be working themselves and thus receiving benefits through their 
own employment.
66
  
The body of family law, employment law, and related benefits law 
interacted to assign the husband/father primary responsibility for wage 
earning and the wife/mother primary responsibility for domestic care. This 
division privatized responsibility for the care and growth of children, by 
seeking to ensure that children would receive both financial support and 
appropriate care. These legal rights reinforced and were in turn 
strengthened by the separate spheres ideology: men should express and 
prove their masculinity by shouldering the breadwinning responsibilities; 
women should express and prove their femininity by providing nurturing 
care and support. Well into the twentieth century, limitations on women’s 
economic freedom and pervasive legal distinctions between the sexes were 
upheld as constitutional on the ground that they appropriately reflected the 
societal understanding that the preferred and proper place for women was 
in the home.
67
 
Homer Clark characterized the significance of sex-specific 
responsibilities in family law in a leading domestic relations treatise 
published in 1968 as follows:  
These rules acquire much of their force and vitality from the fact 
that they construct a model of correct behavior. They are moral 
precepts . . . [that] describe the traditional roles of husband and 
wife. The husband is to provide the family with food, clothing, 
shelter, and as many amenities of life as he can manage. . . . The 
wife is to be mistress of the household, maintaining the home with 
the resources furnished by the husband, and caring for the children. 
A reading of contemporary judicial opinions leaves the impression 
that these rules have not changed over the last two hundred years, in 
spite of the changes in the legal position of the married women 
 
 
 66. Cf. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 n.22 (1983) 
(citing post-Title VII EEOC decisions holding disparate benefits for spouses of male and female 
employees unlawful). 
 67. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (permitting prohibition on female 
bartenders except where provided sufficient oversight by husband or father); cf. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 
U.S. 57, 61–62 (1961) (upholding presumptive exclusion of women from jury service on the ground 
that they are “still regarded as the center of home and family life”).  
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carried through in the Nineteenth Century and her social and 
economic position in this century.
68
 
Sex-based classifications established substantive rights within marriage 
and related benefits law that accorded with the normative ideal of male 
breadwinners and female caretakers. Although the system had an internal, 
mutually reinforcing logic, it limited women’s and men’s freedom to 
choose how to structure their family relationships, characterizing women 
or men who sought a different role as both “unnatural” and failing to meet 
their legal responsibilities. It put women in a position that was financially 
dependent on men and often left women and children vulnerable to 
inadequate support, particularly in the event of divorce. The reforms of the 
1970s eliminated the role that sex-based classifications played in enforcing 
the traditional gendered divide. It was expected that these changes would 
in turn transform the gendered ideology that underlay them. This has 
proven an elusive goal.  
II. DIFFERENT-SEX COUPLES  
A. The Demise of (Most) Sex-Based Classifications 
In the 1960s and 1970s, a growing women’s movement challenged the 
separate spheres ideology that was embodied and enforced by the sex-
based classifications, gender norms, and substantive law that formed the 
traditional marriage equation. Liberal feminists at the time re-imagined the 
idealized marriage not as a union of complementary opposites—in which 
men specialized in breadwinning and women in caretaking—but rather as 
a partnership in which both men and women would participate in the paid 
workplace and share the responsibilities of childcare and housework.
69
 The 
enactment, in 1963, of the Equal Pay Act, which prohibits sex 
discrimination in salary,
70
 and, in 1964, of Title VII, which prohibits 
discrimination in employment more generally,
71
 were significant steps 
 
 
 68. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 181, 182 
(1968). 
 69. See, e.g., NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, TASK FORCE ON THE FAMILY (1967), reprinted in 
FEMINIST CHRONICLES: 1953–1993 201 (Toni Carabillo et al. eds., 1993) (“The basic ideological goal 
of NOW is a society in which men and women have an equitable balance in the time and interest with 
which they participate in work, family and community. NOW should seek and advocate personal and 
institutional measures which would reduce the disproportionate involvement of men in work at the 
expense of meaningful participation in family and community, and the disproportionate involvement 
of women in family at the expense of participation in work and community.”). 
 70. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).  
 71. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006).  
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forward in removing the explicit impediments to women’s paid 
employment. Courts quickly (for better or worse) interpreted these new 
laws to preclude sex-specific “protective” labor legislation, thus 
functionally eliminating what had been the basis for some feminist and 
progressive advocates’ opposition to an Equal Rights Amendment 
(ERA).
72
 In the early 1970s, feminists rallied around the ERA to challenge 
the sex-specific provisions in marriage and related benefits laws that were 
still largely in place.  
The ERA would have amended the Constitution to provide that 
“[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any State on account of sex.”73 In 1971 and 1972, 
when the ERA was debated and ultimately passed by Congress, the 
Supreme Court had not yet held that sex-based classifications within the 
law triggered any particular concern under the Equal Protection Clause; 
accordingly, under then-governing constitutional law principles, such 
classifications could be used so long as there was any kind of rational 
justification for them.
74
 As discussed above, the sex-based classifications 
in family law had been easily upheld as justifiable expressions of the 
traditional norm that men were responsible for breadwinning and women 
for caretaking.
75
  
Enactment of the ERA would have changed this analysis. The likely 
effect of the amendment would have been to raise the level of scrutiny 
afforded to sex-based classifications.
76
 Proponents of the ERA suggested 
that some existing sex-based classifications—such as those concerning 
military service and criminal rape—would be permissible even under more 
searching standards but that most sex-based classifications within family 
law would need to be modified.
77
 For example, states would need to make 
 
 
 72. See generally, e.g., Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An 
Argument for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 209 (1998); Dinner, supra note 62, 
at 444–47. 
 73. Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal 
Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 872 (1971). This article, written by Yale Law Professor Thomas 
Emerson and several of his students, analyzed the likely effects of the proposed amendment. It was 
highly influential and large portions were read verbatim into the Congressional record during debates 
on the amendment. See 118 CONG. REC. 9517–9522 (1972). 
 74. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948) (permitting sex-based classifications 
so long as “basis in reason” could be conceived). In 1971, the Court held for the first time that a sex-
based classification violated the Equal Protection Clause but did so under a rational basis standard. See 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 72–73, 76–77 (1971) (holding Idaho law that preferred males as 
administrators of estates for individuals who died intestate violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
 75. See supra text accompanying note 67.  
 76. See Brown et al., supra note 73, at 875. 
 77. See id. at 936–54.  
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alimony available to both dependent wives and dependent husbands, or 
eliminate it entirely.
78
 But the ERA itself would not have foreclosed post-
divorce support for dependent spouses. Rather, an influential analysis of 
the proposed amendment suggested that alimony laws could be written to 
provide “special protection” to a spouse who had been, or continued to be, 
out of the workforce in order to provide care for a child.
79
 In other words, 
it would not have mandated that men take on domestic or that women take 
on breadwinning responsibilities.  
The marriage equation lens helps make the possibility and limitations 
of this approach clear. As discussed above, all three factors of the marriage 
equation—sex-based classifications, gender norms, and substantive 
marriage law—historically reinforced separate spheres for men and 
women by encouraging or requiring distinct roles. If the primary objective 
of reform was to move from legally enforced specialization to equal 
sharing of domestic and income-producing responsibilities, the most 
effective means of doing so would have been to reform both the sex piece 
of the equation and the marriage piece of the equation and hope that these 
combined changes would spur couples to share responsibilities and help 
break down gender norms. In other words, it would have been more 
effective to not only remove sex-based classifications but also all the non-
sex-specific elements of marriage law that likewise encouraged 
specialization.
80
  
Liberal feminist advocacy at the time, however, prioritized reform only 
of the “sex” piece of the equation—that is, the sex-specific laws that 
imposed distinct obligations on husbands and wives. In part, this probably 
reflects an accurate gauge of what was politically possible. It also 
highlights the tightrope reformers walked, and one that continues to be a 
challenge today. Significant changes to the non-sex-specific incentives 
that encouraged or responded to specialization within marriage, such as 
social security benefits for dependent spouses, would disadvantage the 
(many) women who remained in marriages that embraced traditional 
gender roles. The National Organization for Women (NOW) floated a few 
trial balloons regarding more substantive reforms of marriage law, and 
some radical feminists groups denounced marriage entirely as 
 
 
 78. See id. at 951–53. 
 79. Id. at 952. NOW took a similar position. See NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, ERA POSITION 
PAPER (1967), reprinted in FEMINIST CHRONICLES: 1953–1993 182, 189 (Toni Carabillo et al. eds., 
1993).  
 80. See infra Part II.B.  
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fundamentally flawed by its patriarchal past.
81
 But, other than its ERA 
advocacy, NOW (which was then the leading “mainstream” feminist 
organization) sought to achieve its objective of men and women sharing 
work and family responsibilities primarily through reforms such as 
government support for childcare, increased workplace accommodation of 
caregiving responsibilities, and individual control of reproductive life, 
rather than reform of substantive aspects of marriage and related benefits 
law that protected dependent spouses.
82
  
Opponents of the ERA, by contrast, strategically used the interaction 
among sex, gender, and substantive marriage law to argue against the 
amendment. In Congress, Senator Sam Ervin took the lead in opposing the 
amendment, with arguments that two historians have characterized as a 
“plea[] for the traditional view of women in which gender (culture) and 
sex (anatomy) are fused.”83 He proposed amendments to the ERA that 
would have permitted sex-based classifications to remain in any laws that 
were “reasonably designed to . . . enable [women] to perform their duties 
as homemakers or mothers.”84 Although Ervin’s efforts were unsuccessful, 
and the ERA easily passed both houses of Congress, his speeches were 
subsequently reprinted and circulated widely in the efforts to stop 
ratification by the states.  
Phyllis Schlafly, who led the grassroots opposition movement, likewise 
elided the three elements of the marriage equation. She characterized the 
ERA as an assault on homemakers, something that would deprive them of 
legal protection and undermine their status within society. In her first 
published attack on the ERA, she contended that: 
Women’s lib is a total assault on the role of the American woman as 
wife and mother, and on the family as the basic unit of society. 
Women’s libbers are trying to make wives and mothers unhappy 
 
 
 81. See, e.g., ALICE ECHOLS, DARING TO BE BAD: RADICAL FEMINISM IN AMERICA 1967–1975 
170 (1989) (describing protest which characterized marriage as making women “prisoner[s]” of their 
husbands). 
 82. NOW’s 1967 Task Force on the Family identifies universal childcare as the top priority to 
implement equitable sharing between men and women of domestic and income-producing 
responsibilities. Of the twelve measures it recommended to achieve this objective, five related to 
employment law; two to education; one to reproductive freedom; one to childcare; one to no-fault 
divorce; and two to changes in social security or tax law that would decrease the extent to which they 
encourage couples to specialize. See NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, TASK FORCE ON THE FAMILY, supra 
note 69, at 201–04. 
 83. DONALD G. MATHEWS & JANE SHERRON DE HART, SEX, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF 
ERA 45 (1990). 
 84. Equal Rights 1970: Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 and S.J. Res. 231 Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 91st Cong. 8 (1970) (statement of Sen. Ervin).  
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with their career, to make them feel that they are ‘second-class 
citizens’ and ‘abject slaves.’ Women’s libbers are promoting free 
sex instead of the ‘slavery’ of marriage. They are promoting Federal 
‘day-care centers’ for babies instead of homes. They are promoting 
abortions instead of families.
85
 
In subsequent newsletters, and in her 1977 book The Power of the Positive 
Woman, Schlafly developed these themes. Ignoring the fact that the right 
to support was almost impossible to enforce, Schlafly argued that the ERA 
would abolish the “most basic and precious legal right that wives now 
enjoy: the right be a full-time homemaker.”86 Referencing an Ohio report 
that suggested that the ERA might require the state to provide childcare 
services to ensure that mothers, like fathers, had “freedom” to engage in 
activities outside the home, Schlafly contended that “[e]limination of the 
role of ‘mother’ is a major objective of the women’s liberation 
movement.”87 Schlafly argued that these and other legal developments 
advocated by some ERA supporters—such as requiring social security 
taxes be paid on the contributions made by homemakers—would 
collectively force women out of the home and were part of an effort to 
“deliberately degrade[] the homemaker and hack[] away at her sense of 
self-worth and pride and pleasure in being female.”88 The underlying legal 
analysis in many of these points is debatable, but Schlafly’s arguments, 
not surprisingly, were extremely successful in mobilizing many 
homemakers to oppose the ERA.  
The key thing for purposes of this discussion is to note how Schlafly’s 
claims merged removal of sex-based classifications within law—that is, 
the distinctions between husbands’ and wives’ rights and 
responsibilities—with substantive reform of marriage law and gender 
norms. The ERA would not have required abandonment of alimony or 
support provisions. Thus, enactment of the ERA would not have ended the 
“right to be a full-time homemaker” (to the extent any such right ever 
existed). It simply would have permitted either men or women to play that 
role. NOW and other feminists actually advocated other reforms that were 
intended to increase the security that homemakers would have upon 
 
 
 85. Phyllis Schlafly, What’s Wrong with “Equal Rights” for Women, 5 PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY REP. 
3–4 (1972) (quoted in Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to 
Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1876 (2006)). 
 86. SCHLAFLY, supra note 7, at 79. 
 87. Id. at 87. 
 88. Id. at 69. 
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divorce.
89
 But Schlafly effectively elided distinctions between “sex,” 
“marriage,” and “gender” (“the pleasure in being female”) to make her 
larger point. Historians credit widespread resistance to changing the 
underlying gender norms as key in defeating the amendment.
90
 
As the ERA was being debated and as efforts to enact it eventually 
ground to a halt, liberal feminists, led by Ruth Bader Ginsburg as director 
of the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project, successfully argued that the sex-
based classifications within family law were unconstitutional under the 
existing Equal Protection Clause.
91
 In Reed v. Reed
92—a challenge to an 
Idaho law that established a presumption in favor of men over women in 
the appointment of administrators of estates—the Court first held that such 
distinctions could violate the Constitution.
93
 The Court went on to 
announce in 1976 that sex-based classifications merited heightened 
scrutiny
94
 (although not as rigorous as that applied to race-based 
classifications). The Court struck down a host of sex-based classifications 
that enforced the separate spheres ideology of the family: a presumption 
that unwed fathers, but not mothers, were inadequate caregivers for their 
children;
95
 a presumption that wives, but not husbands, of service 
members were dependent on their spouses;
96
 a categorical ban on 
widowers, but not widows, with minor children receiving social security 
survivors’ benefits;97 a law that extended child support for boys until age 
twenty-one but for girls only until age eighteen;
98
 a law that provided 
alimony upon divorce for women but not for men;
99
 and a law that 
provided benefits to children of unemployed fathers, but not unemployed 
 
 
 89. See, e.g., NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, ERA POSITION PAPER, supra note 79, at 189. 
 90. See generally, e.g., JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986); MATHEWS & DE 
HART, supra note 83; Peggy Pascoe, Sex, Gender, and Same-Sex Marriage, in IS ACADEMIC FEMINISM 
DEAD? THEORY IN PRACTICE 86, 96–102 (Soc. Justice Grp. at The Ctr. for Advanced Feminist Studies, 
Univ. of Minn. ed., 2000). 
 91. For a fascinating exploration of Ginsburg’s litigation strategy and its connection to the 
women’s and gay liberation movements, see Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in 
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010).  
 92. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (articulating a “requirement that the gender-
based difference [in a law] be substantially related to achievement of the statutory objective”). 
 95. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In that case, the Court held that the father’s due 
process rights were violated by the failure to provide him with an opportunity to contest the state’s 
determination of neglect, but also identified an “equal protection” violation in the distinction between 
unmarried fathers and unmarried mothers in protection of these procedural interests. See id. at 649. 
 96. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 97. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
 98. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). 
 99. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
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mothers
100
 (as well as a law that permitted girls to buy low-alcohol beer at 
a younger age than boys).
101
 These decisions collectively dismantled 
almost all sex-based distinctions within marriage law and related benefits 
laws by making the responsibilities of husbands and wives identical and 
reciprocal. Under modern sex discrimination law, sex-based classifications 
are almost always invalid unless they respond to “real” physical 
differences between the sexes.
102
  
Leading constitutional scholars characterize this body of constitutional 
case law as a “de facto ERA”103 that has accomplished “virtually 
everything the ERA would have accomplished.”104 This may be correct, 
but it is a relatively thin understanding of the potential promise of the 
ERA. Supporters believed—and hoped—that the ERA would not merely 
strip sex-based classifications from the law. They hoped that it would also 
spur a more general realignment of gender norms within the family, and 
within society as a whole, that would lead to a more equal sharing of 
responsibilities at home as well as at work. Whether or not this would 
have occurred is impossible to assess definitively.
105
  
What is clear, however, is that the body of Supreme Court decisions 
did not effect a general transformation in gender roles. That is, the Court 
made clear that the government could not rely upon generalizations 
regarding appropriate roles for men and women, or the empirical reality 
that far more women than men were dependent on their spouses for 
economic support, as justification for sex-specific classifications in the 
 
 
 100. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979). 
 101. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 102. These include laws regulating statutory rape, see Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 
(1981) (plurality opinion); birth, see Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); and military service, see 
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). Notably, several justices in each case argued that the sex-
based classifications in each law reflected overbroad stereotypes and should be held unconstitutional. 
See, e.g., Michael M., 450 U.S. at 496 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 89–91 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); Rostker, 453 U.S. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also text 
accompanying supra notes 41–46 (discussing the difficulty of drawing lines between “gender” and 
“sex”).  
 103. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 984–85 
(2002) (“The social changes that did not quite produce the Equal Rights Amendment produced a de 
facto ERA in the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.”). 
 104. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 
U. PA. L. REV. 419, 502 (2001); see also, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional 
Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1476–77 (2001) (“Today, it is difficult to identify any respect 
in which constitutional law is different from what it would have been if the ERA had been adopted.”).  
 105. Cf. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 90, at 2 (“[The ERA’s] direct effects would have been slight, 
but its indirect effects on both judges and legislators would probably have led in the long run to 
interpretations of existing laws and enactment of new laws that would have benefited women.”). 
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law.
106
 The Court held that the separate spheres ideology that “the female 
[is] destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the 
male for the marketplace and the world of ideas” expressed impermissible 
sex stereotypes.
107
 But it did not require the government to take steps to 
affirmatively dismantle the gendered division of responsibility or to 
implement policies that would encourage such realignment.
108
 In fact, 
Reva Siegel and Cary Franklin argue that the debates over the ERA—and 
the popular backlash against it—caused the attorneys in the foundational 
constitutional sex discrimination cases to cabin the scope of the changes 
they sought.
109
  
Many commentators therefore look back at this series of decisions as a 
rather hollow victory.
110
 Some scholars go further, arguing that formal 
equality imposed a symbolic notion of “equality” that makes it difficult to 
achieve structural reforms that could be far more effective in improving 
the condition of women.
111
 The marriage equation framework helps make 
the contours and limits of this reform clear. The constitutional decisions of 
the 1970s changed the marriage equation by requiring that legislatures 
strip sex-based classifications from the law. But they did not change the 
substantive marriage law and they had only a limited effect on gender 
norms. As discussed more fully below, the modified marriage equation left 
by these decisions, which persists to this day, does not actually encourage 
 
 
 106. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (“[A]ny statutory scheme which 
draws a sharp line between the sexes, solely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience, 
necessarily commands ‘dissimilar treatment for men and women who are . . . similarly situated,’ and 
therefore involves the ‘very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the [Constitution] . . . .’” 
(emphasis and omissions in original) (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77, 76 (1971))). 
 107. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14–15 (1975); see also, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 
76, 89 (1979) (holding laws based merely on the “presum[ption] the father has the ‘primary 
responsibility to provide a home and its essentials,’ while the mother is the ‘center of home and family 
life’” unconstitutional (citations omitted)). 
 108. The Court’s unwillingness to recognize disparate impact as a potential ground for liability 
under the Equal Protection Clause largely foreclosed constitutional challenges to sex-neutral policies, 
such as employment preferences for veterans, that disproportionately benefit men. See Personnel 
Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).  
 109. See Siegel, supra note 37, at 1395–99 (describing shift in litigation away from articulating 
issues related to abortion on equality grounds in response to advocacy against the ERA); Franklin, 
supra note 91, at 140–41 (similar); see also Serena Mayeri, A New E.R.A. or a New Era? Amendment 
Advocacy and the Reconstitution of Feminism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1223 (2009) (discussing how 
substantive understandings of the ERA evolved). 
 110. See, e.g., Judith Baer, Advocate on the Court: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Limits of Formal 
Equality, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 216, 230–33 (Earl M. Maltz 
ed., 2003); Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 21 (characterizing both liberal and dominance feminist approaches to legal changes as 
“empty at their core” because they “offer[] no values inconsistent with patriarchal values”).  
 111. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND 
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991). 
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couples to share equally domestic and income-producing responsibilities. 
Rather, the equation changed from one in which sex-based classifications, 
gender norms, and marriage law collectively required men to provide 
support and women to provide caretaking to one which in many respects 
still encourages specialization but is formally agnostic regarding which 
spouse plays which role.  
B. The Gender of Marriage Law  
The body of Supreme Court decisions issued in the 1970s that held sex-
based classifications in family law and related benefits law to be 
unconstitutional was a significant development in sex discrimination law. 
The Court held, for the first time, that sex-based classifications in the law 
could not be justified simply on the grounds that they promoted, or 
reasonably responded to the prevalence of, the traditional division of 
responsibility between husbands and wives. The stereotyping theory that 
the Court adopted in these cases continues to have significant import 
today.
112
 
But the decisions have a separate legacy that is far less considered.
113
 
By simply requiring formal equality, the Court left in place an architecture 
of marriage and related benefits laws that, while no longer sex-specific, 
nevertheless continues to encourage couples to specialize into 
breadwinning and caretaking roles. I call these incentives to specialize the 
“gender” of marriage law. Consider, for example, Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld.
114
 In Weinberger, the Court held unconstitutional a provision 
in social security law that provided benefits for mothers with minor 
children whose wage-earning husbands had died but did not provide 
comparable benefits for fathers with minor children whose wage-earning 
wife had died.
115
 In accordance with the decision in Weinberger, this and 
numerous other provisions of social security law were expanded to cover 
fathers as well as mothers, husbands as well as wives. But the substance of 
social security dependent benefits, structured originally to meet the needs 
 
 
 112. See generally Franklin, supra note 91 (discussing historical context for anti-stereotyping 
theory and its contemporary relevance). 
 113. Nancy Polikoff is an important exception. She has carefully catalogued many of the ways in 
which marriage law encourages spousal specialization and this informs her skepticism regarding the 
normative attractiveness of marriage as an objective for gay and lesbian couples. See generally 
POLIKOFF, supra note 17.  
 114. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
 115. Id. 
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of a family with a breadwinning husband and a caretaking wife, was not 
changed.
116
 
Social security permits a dependent spouse to collect 50 percent of the 
benefits earned by a breadwinning spouse when the dependent spouse 
reaches retirement age, in addition to the benefits collected by the 
breadwinning spouse.
117
 A dependent spouse may also receive benefits to 
support herself or himself
118
 and/or dependent children
119
 upon the death 
of a wage-earning spouse. These benefits are also available to divorced 
spouses if the marriage has lasted at least ten years.
120
 In other words, even 
if a dependent spouse has not engaged in paid work (and thus has not paid 
into the social security system at all), she or he is entitled to significant 
benefits based on her or his spouse’s contributions. Although the policy is 
now formally sex-neutral, almost all of the beneficiaries are couples in 
which the husband dramatically out-earned the wife; a recent study found 
that 99% of claimants of spousal benefits are women.
121
 Couples in which 
both spouses earn relatively similar incomes generally do not benefit from 
these provisions because each individual’s own benefit rate is higher than 
the dependent benefits they could collect. Social security thus subsidizes 
specialization by spouses into breadwinning and caregiving roles and 
spreads the risk associated with such specialization across the wage-
earning, social-security-tax-paying workforce. In a somewhat stylized but 
still illuminating example, a married couple in which one spouse earns 
twice the national average wage and the other spouse does not engage in 
paid work collectively receives $100,000 more in social security benefits 
over a typical lifetime than a married couple in which each spouse earns 
the national average wage.
122
 Efforts to “update” the law to better protect 
 
 
 116. Phyllis Schlafly used the possibility that these spousal benefits would be eliminated as one of 
her prominent arguments against the ERA. See ERA Will Take Away Social Security Rights of Wives 
and Widows, EAGLE FORUM, http://www.eagleforum.org/era/flyer/ERA-07.pdf. 
 117. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (2006) (wives’ benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 402(c) (2006) (husbands’ 
benefits).  
 118. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (2006) (widows’ benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 402(f) (2006) (widowers’ 
benefits). 
 119. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (2006) (mothers’ and fathers’ benefits). 
 120. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b), (c), (d), (e) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 416(d) (2006) (defining divorced 
spouses). 
 121. See Theodore F. Figinski, Women and the Social Security Earnings Test, 1 n.2 (Mar. 31, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1821290. The extraordinarily 
lopsided sex-allocation is undoubtedly in part because the benefits are available to retired workers and 
thus reflect a more traditional allocation of wage earning than will be true in the future as younger 
couples, including a greater percentage where wives significantly out-earn husbands, reach retirement 
age.  
 122. Eugene Steuerle et al., Does Social Security Treat Spouses Fairly?, URBAN INS. (Nov. 30, 
1999), http://www.urban.org/publications/309257.html. These rules also mean that a married couple 
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couples who share wage-earning responsibilities more equally have been 
consistently unsuccessful.
123
  
Federal tax law, likewise, encourages such specialization. It imposes a 
“marriage penalty” on many married couples who earn relatively 
comparable amounts—those couples pay more than they would pay 
collectively if they were able to file individual returns—and provides a 
“marriage bonus” for couples with a significant disparity in earnings.124 
Because of marital joint returns, the earnings of a “secondary” wage earner 
are taxed at higher rates than they otherwise would be.
125
 Additionally, if 
both members of the couple work outside the home, they pay taxes on the 
income they earn, including income used to purchase childcare services 
(other than a limited credit or set-aside) or assistance with housework.
126
 
By contrast, if one member of the couple stays home and provides 
childcare or housework services herself or himself, the couple pays no tax 
on the imputed value of such services, further increasing the marriage 
“bonus” for couples with such specialization.127 Additionally, employers 
often make health insurance available to an employee and her or his 
spouse and dependents. This benefit, when used by married couples, is not 
taxed; even if employers offer such benefits to partners of gay and lesbian 
 
 
with a single wage earner receives far more in collective benefits than a wage earner who makes the 
same salary as the breadwinner but is not married. 
 123. See generally Goodwin Liu, Social Security and the Treatment of Marriage: Spousal 
Benefits, Earnings Sharing, and the Challenge of Reform, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1.  
 124. See Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Have and to Hold: What Does Love (of Money) Have to 
Do with Joint Filing?, 11 NEV. L.J. 718, 719–20 (2011). Statutes enacted in 2001 and 2003 largely 
removed the marriage penalty for taxpayers in the lower tax brackets, but penalties remain for higher-
income families. These changes actually increased the marriage bonus for many families with a single 
primary wage earner. Although they were politically popular, the future of these reforms is in question 
as they are set to expire along with other Bush-era tax changes. See id. For other discussions of the 
effects of marriage penalties and bonuses, see, for example, EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 
12–19 (1997); McMahon, supra at 720 n.10 (citing a number of relevant sources); Shari Motro, A New 
“I Do”: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1509, 1560–68 (2006). 
 125. Scholars have long critiqued this as discouraging employment by women. See McMahon, 
supra note 124, at 720 n.10. 
 126. An individual or a couple who purchases childcare for work-related needs generally may 
elect to receive a tax credit for a portion of childcare expenses or to set aside up to $5000 of pre-tax 
income to purchase childcare services. See IRS PUB. NO. 503, CHILD AND DEPENDENT CARE 
EXPENSES 9 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p503.pdf. The expense of full-time 
child care often far exceeds these potential tax savings. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF CHILD CARE RES. & 
REFERRAL AGENCIES, PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF CHILD CARE: 2011 UPDATE 7, available at 
http://www.naccrra.org/sites/default/files/default_site_pages/2011/cost_report_2011_full_report_0.pdf 
(“The average cost of full-time child care for an infant in a center in 2010 ranged from $4,650 in 
Mississippi to more than $18,200 in the District of Columbia” and the comparable average annual cost 
for a four-year-old child ranged from “$3900 in Mississippi to $14,5000 in the District of Columbia”).  
 127. See Lily Kahng, One is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 
61 HASTINGS L.J. 651, 662 (2010). 
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employees (or domestic partners of unmarried heterosexual employees), 
the employees must pay a tax on the value of the policy.
128
  
Although having one spouse opt out of the paid labor market is often 
conceived of as a “luxury” for the middle- or upper-class, two of the most 
significant government assistance programs for low-income families also 
encourage, or at least permit, a breadwinner-caretaker divide for married 
couples. In 1996, welfare was dramatically reformed to move recipients 
from “welfare to work.” Supporters of the legislation justified work 
requirements by pointing to the statistics, discussed in Part II.C, showing 
dramatic increases in the number of mothers in the paid work force and 
arguing that poor women receiving government support should likewise be 
required to work outside the home. But as Noah Zatz has demonstrated, 
the federal legislation actually imposes hourly work requirements on 
families collectively. In single-parent families, the parent (usually a 
mother) must work to receive benefits, but two-parent families can receive 
benefits so long as either parent, or the two parents together, meets slightly 
higher hour requirements.
129
 Similarly, the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) determines eligibility for benefits on the basis of household 
earnings, with identical or almost identical standards applying for single-
parent households and dual-parent households.
130
 Under both programs, 
since the value of childcare provided by a parent is not imputed as income, 
it will often make sense for one parent to provide childcare and the other 
to perform the paid work.
131
 This is all the more true since earned income 
by both parents could easily push even a quite poor family over the 
 
 
 128. See M.V. LEE BADGETT, UNEQUAL TAXES ON EQUAL BENEFITS: THE TAXATION OF 
DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS 1, 4 (2007), http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/ 
18040.pdf. This is true even if they are married under state law, because federal tax law does not 
recognize the marriage. See id. 
 129. See Noah D. Zatz, Revisiting the Class-Parity Analysis of Welfare Work Requirements, 83 
SOC. SERV. REV. 313, 322 (2009). The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program 
requires a single parent to work (or participate in other qualifying activities, which include some 
education and training programs) at least thirty hours per week, although some exceptions apply to 
parents with children under the age of six. Id. at 317. Two-parent families must work collectively at 
least thirty-five hours per week (far less than the sixty hours per week that would be the equivalent of 
simply twice the single-parent requirement). Id. at 322. The majority of states permit the two-parent 
work requirement to be satisfied by either parent or by the parents collectively; a few encourage or 
require that they be satisfied by a single breadwinner. See id. at 326–27. By contrast, a significant 
minority of states require both parents to do at least some work and some further require an equal 
division. See id.  
 130. See Gregory Acs & Elaine Maag, Irreconcilable Differences? The Conflict Between 
Marriage Promotion Initiatives for Cohabiting Couples with Children and Marriage Penalties in Tax 
and Transfer Programs, in NEW FEDERALISM: NAT’L SURVEY OF AM.’S FAMILIES, at 2 (Urban Inst. 
Ser. No. B-66) (Apr. 2005); Zatz, supra note 129, at 328. 
 131. Cf. Zatz, supra note 129, at 341. 
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eligibility threshold. Indeed, although the EITC has been shown to 
increase single mothers’ employment, it seems to decrease married 
mothers’ employment.132  
For many couples, an extra wage more than compensates for the tax, 
social security, welfare, or EITC benefits described above. Nonetheless, at 
least for couples in which one spouse’s earning potential far exceeds the 
other spouse’s, or where the cost of paying for childcare (or elder care) 
and other domestic services is close to the wages that one spouse would 
earn, such provisions can encourage couples to specialize in breadwinning 
and caregiving roles.
133
  
The incentives embodied in these government programs are 
complemented by societal and personal understandings of marriage that 
likewise encourage many couples to specialize. A decision to marry is a 
statement from each member of the couple that they intend to remain in 
the relationship, ideally for life. Marriage naturally encourages a shift from 
an individualized focus to a family-based focus for decision-making. 
Members of a family develop interdependencies. They can take advantage 
of individual skills and aptitudes and reap gains from specialization. They 
can subordinate immediate interests of one or both members of the couple 
for expected collective long-term gain. There is nothing inherently 
gendered in dividing responsibilities with a spouse in a complementary 
fashion, but as discussed more fully below, in the vast majority of 
different-sex couples, women take on greater responsibility for non-
income producing domestic work and men for income-producing work.
134
  
The gendered architecture of marriage law also persists in the 
protections that state laws provide to a dependent spouse if the relationship 
comes to an end. First, marriage law makes it hard to exit a relationship. A 
court must adjudicate a divorce or approve a settlement. In most states, a 
court has the power to award a share of property acquired during a 
marriage, regardless of title.
135
 Courts are generally instructed to 
“equitably divide” such property; a typical statute requires consideration 
of factors such as the extent to which one spouse has provided care for 
children or has facilitated the other spouse’s wage-earning, as well as the 
 
 
 132. Nada Eissa & Hilary Williamson Hoynes, Taxes and the Labor Market Participation of 
Married Couples: The Earned Income Tax Credit, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1931, 1932 (2004).  
 133. My thanks to Stephanie McMahon for helping me to clarify this point.  
 134. See infra Part II.C.  
 135. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3501 (West 2010) (allowing for the division of marital 
property upon divorce); Thomas Oldham, Changes in the Economic Consequences of Divorces, 1958–
2008, 42 FAM. L. Q. 419, 427–29 (2008) (discussing emergence of equitable distribution).  
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relative ability of the spouses to support themselves.
136
 Courts are also 
empowered, at least in certain circumstances, to order a wage-earning 
spouse to make maintenance or alimony payments to a dependent spouse 
even after a marriage has ended.
137
 Even though the vast majority of 
divorces are resolved through private negotiations, dependent spouses 
negotiating in the “shadow of the law” can use these substantive 
entitlements to strengthen their position.
138
  
As discussed more fully below, contemporary marriage law is far from 
sufficient to protect fully a dependent spouse’s financial standing after 
divorce.
139
 But the law provides considerably greater recourse to a 
dependent spouse than to a similarly situated person cohabiting with a 
partner. Marriage law establishes as a default an expectation that property 
accumulated and income earned during the marriage will be shared, and it 
empowers courts to effectuate such divisions.
140
 By contrast, no court 
needs to be involved when a cohabiting relationship ends, and (if courts do 
become involved) the legal default is that individual members of the 
couple leave the relationship with the income each earned and any 
property such income was used to acquire. In other words, a dependent 
cohabitor who drops out of the workplace to provide domestic support 
might well have no claim to property or income accumulated by her 
partner.
141
 Even if a dependent cohabitor has the foresight, resources, and 
 
 
 136. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 3502(a) (West 2010) (factors considered in equitable 
distribution include the contribution by one party to the increased earning power of the other, 
including contributions as a homemaker; the amount and sources of income of each party; and the 
opportunity for future income). Equitable distribution statutes also however typically consider the 
extent to which each party contributed to the acquisition or appreciation of marital property, a factor 
that can favor the breadwinning spouse. See id.  
 137. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 3701 (West 2010) (allowing courts to award alimony). 
Pennsylvania still permits courts to award open-ended alimony. See id. § 3701(c). Many other states 
now generally permit only short-term awards designed to permit a dependent spouse to become self-
sufficient. See infra text accompanying note 213. 
 138. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
 139. See infra Part II.D.  
 140. Through prenuptial and other contractual agreements, married couples may depart from these 
defaults, but courts typically review such contracts for procedural and, in many states, substantive 
fairness. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348, 351–52 (N.H. 2003) (describing heightened 
scrutiny applied to prenuptial agreements).  
 141. If the couple has children in common, and if the dependent cohabitor maintained custody of 
the children after dissolution of the relationship, she or he would have a claim for child support. 
Additionally, some states recognize implicit contracts or equitable principles such as unjust enrichment 
as grounds for allocating a share of income to the dependent cohabitor. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 
134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 829–30 (Ct. App. 1976); Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1330–31 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1980). There is little empirical research on the economic effects of ending a cohabitation, but one 
study found that female cohabitors’ standard of living drops far more dramatically than male 
cohabitors’ standard of living when the relationship ends. See Sarah Avellar & Pamela Smock, The 
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bargaining power to contract explicitly with a partner for financial 
recompense if the relationship unravels, she or he may still have no legal 
recourse because courts in some states refuse to enforce even express 
contracts between cohabitors.
142
  
The law makes similar distinctions between married and unmarried 
individuals upon death. If a married individual dies without a will, 
intestacy laws typically provide that at least half, and in some states and 
under some circumstances, all, of an estate passes to a spouse. If a married 
individual dies with a will, state laws typically provide that, regardless of 
the will’s terms, a spouse has a right to elect to receive between one third 
and one half of the estate.
143
 Federal tax law permits property to pass to a 
surviving spouse tax-free.
144
 By contrast, if a cohabiting partner dies 
intestate, his or her property will pass to his or her children, parents, 
siblings, or other family members, or simply revert to the state, rather than 
to the partner.
145
 Even if an individual has left property to a cohabiting 
partner in a will, the partner will often need to pay taxes that a spouse 
would be excused from paying.  
Employment law also retains a significantly “gendered” architecture. A 
comprehensive discussion of employment law is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but as described in Part I.B, employment law, like family law, 
once used sex-based classifications to enforce the separate spheres 
ideology. Most explicit distinctions on the basis of sex were made illegal 
by the enactment of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII.
146
 But, as in family 
law, these laws primarily have been held to simply require formal equality, 
and thus the norms and substantive law of the workplace, designed around 
 
 
Economic Consequences of the Dissolution of Cohabiting Unions, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 315, 324 
(2005). The drop experienced by female cohabitors was less severe than that experienced by wives 
following a divorce, but the researchers attributed this to the fact that married household incomes are 
considerably higher on average than cohabiting household incomes. See id. at 323. As the researchers 
put it, "relationship dissolution . . . [is] an equalizer among married and cohabiting women. When a 
coresidential union ends, women end up in strikingly similar positions; some just fall farther to get 
there.” Id. at 325. 
 142. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979).  
 143. For a detailed description of each state’s laws regarding transfer of property upon death, see 
Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227. 
Rosenbury argues that divorce laws often provide greater protection to a dependent spouse than the 
laws governing property distribution at death. See id. at 1260–61, 1273–74. 
 144. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUBLICATION 950: INTRODUCTION TO ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXES (Rev. 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p950.pdf. Gifts between 
spouses are also tax-free. See id. 
 145. See, e.g., Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and 
Demographic Status, 2009 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J. 36, 55, 57–58. 
 146. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).  
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a (male) worker with (female) support at home, remain largely in place.
147
 
The standard in American law is a forty-hour work week that far exceeds 
the hours children are in school; mandatory overtime is permitted and 
common; and there is no right to take time off to care for a child who 
needs to miss a day of school for a routine illness or to go to a doctor.
148
 
The Family and Medical Leave Act provides unpaid leave upon birth or 
adoption of a child, and to care for a family member with a serious health 
condition,
149
 but roughly half of American workers do not qualify for 
FMLA leave, either because their employer is too small or because they 
have not worked a requisite number of hours.
150
 Many more cannot afford 
to take unpaid time off.  
Employee benefits in turn facilitate a choice by a married couple to 
have one spouse drop out of the paid workforce by providing benefits to a 
dependent spouse and children. Employers that provide health care 
benefits typically make them available only to employees, their spouses, 
and their dependents. Other employer-sponsored benefits, such as pension 
rights, likewise are typically made available to an employee and a spouse. 
Employers could choose to provide some of these benefits to unmarried 
partners of employees, but most use marriage as a bright line test to 
 
 
 147. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 64–113 (2000) (discussing masculine “ideal worker” norm). Title VII also 
prohibits facially neutral policies that cause a “disparate impact” on the basis of sex, but courts’ 
generous interpretation of the “business necessity” defense has limited the utility of these provisions to 
challenge non-family-friendly policies. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the 
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1226–30 (1989) (discussing difficulty 
of overcoming business necessity defense). Joan Williams and Nancy Segal characterize the 
limitations of disparate impact liability as “accepted wisdom,” but identify a few cases in which 
disparate impact claims have been successful. Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal 
Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S 
L.J. 77, 78, 134–38 (2003). More importantly, they also identify several other claims that can be used 
to challenge what they call the “maternal wall.” See id. at 122–61 (discussing disparate treatment 
theories under Title VII as well as claims under other statutes including the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Equal Pay Act, and state statutes).  
 148. See, e.g., Shirley Lung, Overwork and Overtime, 39 IND. L.J. 51, 58 (2005) (explaining the 
Fair Labor Standards Act “establishes the forty-hour work week as the norm” and “permit[s] 
employers to require unlimited overtime hours if they [a]re willing to pay for it”); id. at 61 (citing 
study finding one-third of workers who performed overtime were forced by their employer to do so); 
U.S. Joint Economic Committee, Expanding Access to Paid Sick Leave: The Impact of the Healthy 
Families Act on America’s Workers 2 (2010), available at http://jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a= 
Files.Serve&File_id=abf8aca7-6b94-4152-b720-2d8d04b81ed6 (advocating for enactment of 
legislation guaranteeing most workers paid sick days and stating that “millions of workers are unable 
to miss work without forgoing a paycheck—or risking job loss”). 
 149. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2006). 
 150. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the 
Department of Labor’s Request for Information, 72 FED. REG. 35550, 35622 (2007) (2005 data 
showing 76.1 million of 141.7 million total U.S. employees, or approximately 54%, are eligible).  
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determine eligibility, and, as noted above, tax policy and other regulation 
encourages this.  
Empirical studies have attempted to track the significance of the bundle 
of legal rights discussed above on decision-making by different-sex 
couples. Studies that compare the labor allocation of married couples to 
that of cohabiting couples provide support for the assertion that marriage 
encourages specialization. Although researchers disagree as to the 
significance of certain subsidiary factors, numerous studies find that 
married couples, as compared to cohabiting couples, are more likely to 
make long-term cooperative investments in each other and in their 
relationships, such as those implicit in specializing into breadwinning and 
caregiving roles.
151
 However, researchers have recognized that with 
different-sex couples, the significance of these studies may be limited by 
concerns that they reflect a “selection bias”: different-sex couples who 
choose long-term cohabitation rather than marriage may have a 
predilection for greater individual autonomy.
152
 As discussed more fully in 
Part III, same-sex couples offer an exciting research possibility precisely 
because state variation among the possibility of couples’ marrying helps 
control for this selection bias (albeit in a way that I think unfairly 
compromises individuals’ civil rights).  
More generally, it is difficult to determine how much work legal 
incentives, relative to gender norms, play in couples’ decisions to 
specialize; again, as discussed below, one key benefit of the marriage 
equation framework is that it can help disaggregate these effects. That 
said, it seems clear that legal rights do play a role in many decisions made 
by couples. Since individual health insurance plans are often prohibitively 
expensive, access to employer-sponsored health care benefits through 
marriage can be a key factor in permitting one adult in a family to stay 
home. While few couples choose whether to marry purely based on tax 
planning, the potential marriage benefits and penalties are widely 
 
 
 151. See, e.g., Niko Matouschek & Imram Rasul, The Economics of the Marriage Contract: 
Theories and Evidence, 51 J.L. & ECON. 59 (2008); Elizabeth S. Scott, Marital Commitment and the 
Legal Regulation of Divorce, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 35 (Antony 
W. Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds., 2002); see also, e.g., Jeanne A. Batalova & Philip N. Cohen, 
Premarital Cohabitation and Housework: Couples in Cross-National Perspective, 64 J. MARRIAGE & 
FAM. 743 (2002) (comparing division of labor among cohabiting couples in twenty-two countries); 
Teresa Ciabattari, Cohabitation and Housework: The Effects of Marital Intentions, 66 J. MARRIAGE & 
FAM. 118 (2004) (analyzing effect of marital intentions among cohabitors on division of housework).  
 152. See, e.g., Julie Brines & Kara Joyner, The Ties that Bind: Principles of Cohesion in 
Cohabitation and Marriage, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 333 (1999). 
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discussed.
153
 So are the potential trade-offs between paying for childcare 
to earn a second (taxable) income versus the (nontaxable imputed value 
of) staying home.
154
 Basic retirement planning typically helps couples 
understand social security spousal benefits, as well as ways in which some 
couples with disparate earnings may maximize benefits by receiving 
sequentially both spousal benefits and primary benefits.
155
 Even legal 
rights that one might assume were much less well known have been shown 
to have an effect on decision-making. For example, several studies have 
found that couples have sufficient awareness of divorce law such that 
changes in the substantive law—such as greater or lesser protections for a 
dependent spouse—affects bargaining between spouses and the 
willingness to invest in marriage-specific capital during the marriage 
itself.
156
  
In fact, to the extent that individuals make assumptions about legal 
rights associated with marriage, they may well assume that the law 
provides more protection to dependent spouses than it actually does—and 
thus these misconceptions might “over-push” couples to specialize. For 
example, practitioners report that despite reforms to alimony made more 
than a generation ago, it is still quite common for individuals to believe 
that all women (and only women) receive alimony upon divorce.
157
 In 
 
 
 153. See, e.g., Donald E. Hodson, Marriage Tax Penalty, HITCHED, http://www.hitchedmag.com/ 
article.php?id=508 (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (“[I]f you both earn enough to be taxed at 25% . . . you 
suffer a ‘penalty.’ . . . The flip side to the marriage penalty is the marriage tax bonus. You are eligible 
for the tax bonus when only one of you is employed.”); William Perez, Getting Married and Taxes, 
ABOUT.COM, http://taxes.about.com/od/taxplanning/qt/marriage_tax.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) 
(“Strictly from a tax perspective, getting married makes the most sense when one spouse earns income 
and the other spouse doesn’t earn income. . . . [And] staying single makes the most sense when both 
life-partners earn income.”). 
 154. See, e.g., Alan Marc Feigenbaum, Keep Working or Stay at Home with the Kids?, 
INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 21, 2010), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/pf/07/cut_an_income.asp#axzz1 
ZAoDa2vH.  
 155. See, e.g., Jonathan Pond, 4 Tips for Boosting Your Social Security Benefits, AARP (Aug. 13, 
2010), http://www.aarp.org/work/social-security/info-08-2010/4-Tips-for-Boosting-Your-Social-Security-
Benefits.html?CMP=KNC-360I-GOOGLE-WOR-SOC&HBX_PK=spousal_benefit&utm_source=Goo 
gle&utm_medium=cpc&utm_term=spousal%2Bbenefit&utm_campaign=G_Work&360cid=SI_1626099
01_6446871421_1; Dana Anspach, Key Things to Know about the Social Security Spouse Benefit, 
ABOUT.COM, http://moneyover55.about.com/od/socialsecuritybenefits/a/socialsecurityspousebenefit 
.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).  
 156. See, e.g., Betsey Stevenson, The Impact of Divorce Laws on Marriage-Specific Capital, 25 J. 
LAB. ECON. 75 (2007) (collecting and reviewing studies). 
 157. Practitioners, both supportive and opposed to generous alimony provisions, identify these as 
common misconceptions. See, e.g., Patricia M. Barbarito, Is It True That You Are Automatically 
Entitled to Receive Alimony for a Percentage of the Number of Years You Were Married?, DIVORCE 
MAGAZINE.COM, http://www.divorcemag.com/NJ/faq/legalbarbarito.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) 
(“Clients have told me (with great conviction) over the years that: only men pay alimony (a myth); all 
women are entitled to alimony (also a myth); and a cheating spouse always pays alimony (to the great 
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reality, only about 15 percent of divorces include alimony or maintenance 
awards; moreover, these are often for only relatively short periods of time 
and are frequently difficult to enforce.
158
  
There are some compelling reasons why marriage and related benefits 
law should offer protection to dependent spouses who subordinate, or 
forego entirely, their earning potential to meet domestic responsibilities. 
My point here is simply to note that in myriad ways, the law of marriage—
although now sex-neutral—continues to encourage spouses to specialize 
into breadwinning and caretaking roles. And, as the next subpart details, 
most different-sex couples who choose to specialize do so along 
traditional gendered lines.  
C. A Stalled Revolution 
The separate spheres ideology characterized women’s place as in the 
home and men’s as in the workplace. As described in Part II.A above, 
during the 1960s and 1970s, the sex-specific aspects of family law that 
enforced these roles were held to be unconstitutional, and new laws were 
enacted that outlawed sex discrimination in employment. Subsequent to 
these changes, there has been a dramatic growth in women’s employment.  
Women now typically share breadwinning responsibility. In 1960, only 
27% of married women with children under eighteen participated in the 
paid labor force;
159
 by 1970, that figure had already climbed to almost 
40%;
160
 and by 2008, it was just under 70%.
161
 In 1970, working wives 
 
 
disappointment of many, not true!).”); Common Misconceptions About Family Law, ILLINOIS LEGAL 
AID, http://www.illinoislegalaid.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.printvideotranscript&webcastxmlfile 
=archive3407.xml&contentID=3407 (last updated Nov. 2004) (“A lot of people believe that women 
will always get maintenance or always get alimony . . . or [will say] I’m a man [so] I can’t get alimony 
or maintenance.”); Aaron Dishon, Spousal Support FAQ, END SPOUSAL SUPPORT, http://www. 
endspousalsupport.com/spousal-support-faq (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (“Q[uestion]: Do all divorces 
or separations involve spousal support? [Answer]: No, this is a common misconception.”). 
 158. See, e.g., Constance L. Shehan et al., Alimony: An Anomaly in Family Social Science, 51 
FAM. REL. 308, 308, 310, 312 (2002). See also infra Part II.D (discussing contemporary alimony 
policy and practice).  
 159. TRANSIT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM, TRANSIT MARKETS OF THE FUTURE: THE 
CHALLENGE OF CHANGE 76 (1998) (“In 1986, more than 61 percent of married women with children 
under 18 worked outside the home—compared with only 27 percent in 1960.”); see also KARINE MOE 
& DIANNA SHANDY, GLASS CEILINGS & 100-HOUR COUPLES: WHAT THE OPT-OUT PHENOMENON 
CAN TEACH US ABOUT WORK AND FAMILY 16 fig.2 (2010) (graph showing in 1960 approximately 
27% of married women with children were in labor force). 
 160. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 2008 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 380 
tbl.580 (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/08abstract/labor.pdf (39.7% of all 
married women with children were in labor force in 1970).  
 161. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 15 tbl.6 
(2009) [hereinafter DATABOOK 2009], available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2009.pdf. 
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contributed 27% of their families’ total incomes; by 2007, that figure had 
risen to 36%.
162
 More strikingly, in 2007, 26% of wives earned more than 
their husbands.
163
 The recession of 2008–2009 compounded this trend, as 
more men than women lost jobs.
164
 
Although married women’s participation in the labor force has 
increased markedly, they still perform far more housework than married 
men. In 1965, married women spent about seven times as many hours as 
their husbands on housework; now married women spend about twice as 
much time as their husbands on housework.
165
 A significant gap exists 
even when both spouses have paid employment. For example, recent 
studies assert that when both spouses work full-time, the wife still 
typically does twenty-eight hours of housework while the husband does 
just over sixteen hours per week.
166
 The kind of housework varies as well; 
women more typically do the cleaning, cooking, and laundry while men 
more typically do more sporadic jobs such as house maintenance and lawn 
mowing.
167
 Thus, women perform more domestic work and the work that 
they do has less flexibility in terms of scheduling. Women working full 
time also still generally do more childcare than their husbands, although 
some recent studies suggest that this imbalance is narrowing considerably, 
 
 
The rise in married mothers’ labor participation, combined with a rise in single-parent headed families, 
means that only one in five families consists of the traditional male breadwinner, female homemaker 
structure. See Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Characteristics of 
Families—2010 tbl.2 (Mar. 24, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/famee.pdf.  
 162. DATABOOK 2009, supra note 161, at 2. Other estimates are even higher. See, e.g., Heather 
Boushey, The New Breadwinners, in THE SHRIVER REPORT: A WOMAN’S NATION CHANGES 
EVERYTHING 31, 36 (2009), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/10/pdf/awn/ 
a_womans_nation.pdf (married mothers contribute on average 42.2% of families’ total incomes).  
 163. DATABOOK 2009, supra note 161, at 2. Because of the significant number of households 
headed by a single parent, nearly 40% of mothers are the primary breadwinners for their families. 
Boushey, supra note 162, at 32.  
 164. Id. at 33 (men accounted for three out of every four jobs lost in the recession).  
 165. See Suzanne M. Bianchi & Sara B. Raley, Time Allocation in Families, in WORK, FAMILY, 
HEALTH, AND WELL-BEING 19, 30 tbl.2.5 (Bianchi et al. eds., 2005); see also Mylène Lachance-Grzela 
& Geneviève Bouchard, Why Do Women Do the Lion’s Share of Housework? A Decade of Research, 
63 SEX ROLES 767, 768 (2010) (collecting studies). 
 166. Michael Kimmel, Has a Man’s World Become a Woman’s Nation?, in THE SHRIVER 
REPORT, A WOMAN’S NATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 323, 348, available at http://www.american 
progress.org/issues/2009/10/pdf/awn/a_womans_nation.pdf (citing Lisa Belkin, When Mom and Dad 
Share it All, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 15, 2008, at 47); see also, e.g., Sharon Bartley et al., Husbands 
and Wives in Dual-Earner Marriages: Decision-Making, Gender Role Attitudes, Division of 
Household Labor, and Equity, 37 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 69, 87 (2005) (“[H]usbands and wives in 
these dual-earner families appear to divide tasks along traditional gendered lines. . . . Husbands 
performed an average of 20+ hours of household labor per week, whereas wives performed an average 
of 34 hours of household labor per week.”). 
 167. See Solomon et al., supra note 19, at 566 tbl.1. 
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particularly among younger men.
168
 Working women are also more likely 
than their working husbands to take on responsibility for care of elderly 
family members.
169
 These factors collectively give rise to the reality that 
Arlie Hochschild famously described as the “second shift.”170 Women 
work significant hours outside the home and then return to significant 
childcare and housework responsibilities at home. It is important to note, 
however, that men tend to spend more hours in their paid employment, so 
some studies suggest that on average the total number of hours “worked” 
by each spouse may be close to equivalent.
171
  
Labor force participation and housework division are only part of the 
story. Working mothers are far more likely than working fathers to miss 
work for children’s illnesses or when childcare arrangements break 
down.
172
 Working mothers are also far more likely than fathers to forego 
or transition out of time-intensive or travel-intensive careers when children 
are born.
173
 They are more likely to quit when required to work extensive 
overtime and/or when their spouses are required to work extensive 
overtime.
174
 Women are also far more likely than men to work part-
time;
175
 this is particularly common for married mothers.
176
  
 
 
 168. See, e.g., Kimmel, supra note 166, at 350–51 (reporting that men on average spend 3 hours a 
day on work days with children under the age of thirteen and women on average spend 3.8 hours); see 
also generally KATHLEEN GERSON, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: HOW A NEW GENERATION IS 
RESHAPING FAMILY, WORK, AND GENDER IN AMERICA (2010) (discussing widely shared aspirations 
among younger Americans to share work and domestic responsibilities more equally, but also 
documenting tensions and resistance); cf. SUZANNE M. BIANCHI ET AL., CHANGING RHYTHMS OF 
AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 69 tbl.4.2 (2006) (reporting based on data from 2000 that married mothers 
spend almost 19 hours per week in primary and secondary care and that married fathers spend almost 
nine). 
 169. See, e.g., RICHARD W. JOHNSON & ANTHONY T. LO SASSO, THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN 
HOURS OF PAID EMPLOYMENT AND TIME ASSISTANCE TO ELDERLY PARENTS AT MIDLIFE 20, 33 tbl.1, 
34 tbl.2 (2000), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/elderly_parents.pdf (finding 25.5% 
of women and 13.6% of men in paid employment provided significant time help to elderly parents or 
parents-in-law). 
 170. ARLIE HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND 
THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989).  
 171. See, e.g., BIANCHI ET AL., supra note 168, at 115.  
 172. See, e.g., MOE & SHANDY, supra note 159 at 63 (citing a study finding that two-thirds of 
“highly educated, employed” women report taking time off to take a child to a doctor while only 7% of 
their husbands had).  
 173. See id. at 52–58. 
 174. Youngjoo Cha, Reinforcing Separate Spheres: The Effect of Spousal Overwork on Men’s and 
Women’s Employment in Dual-Earner Households, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 303, 313–26 (2010); see also 
generally MOE & SHANDY, supra note 159 (describing phenomenon they dub the “100-hour couple” 
where extensive overtime demands on both members of a couple lead to the wife dropping out of the 
labor force). 
 175. DATABOOK 2009, supra note 161, at 70–72 tbl.20 (24.6% of employed women usually 
worked part-time compared with 11.1% of employed men in 2008). 
 176. MOE & SHANDY, supra note 159, at 62. 
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In the United States, a significant gender gap in the allocation of 
domestic responsibilities within marriage exists across racial-ethnic 
categories. However, the size of the gap varies by racial-ethnic categories, 
with black married couples typically displaying the least inequality. For 
example, one recent study looking at the gap in “core housework” found it 
ranged from 5.54 for Hispanic couples (that is, that Hispanic wives did 5-
and-half times more “core housework” than their husbands), to 4.12 for 
Asian couples, 3.16 for white couples, and “only” 2.79 for black 
couples.
177
 Researchers surmise that the relatively greater equality in black 
couples likely reflects the greater earning power of black women relative 
to black men, racial-ethnic differences in “doing gender,” or the 
prevalence of egalitarian norms.
178
 For all racial and ethnic groups, class 
may likewise be a significant variable, as several studies have found that 
as women’s absolute earning power increases they may “out-source” 
greater amounts of domestic work thus reducing the disparity between 
husbands and wives (albeit to a domestic workforce that is overwhelming 
female, and also disproportionately minority).
179
 The availability of free 
childcare from extended family (e.g., a grandmother who cares for 
children while parents work) may also vary according to class, race, and 
ethnicity, and may likewise play a key role in how couples allocate 
domestic responsibilities.
180
  
Since law no longer mandates that men and women play distinct roles 
within marriage, social scientists have tried to measure and explain drivers 
of this persistent gender imbalance. One prominent theory, initially 
propounded by Gary Becker, focuses on the efficiencies provided by 
specialization. Becker argued that households, like companies, benefit 
from a certain level of specialization.
181
 Both work in the paid workforce 
and work inside the home require skills that can be developed through 
experience, and the family unit will benefit collectively if one member of 
the household develops expertise in the former and a separate member of 
 
 
 177. Liana C. Sayer & Leigh Fine, Racial-Ethnic Differences in U.S. Married Women’s and 
Men’s Housework, 101 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 259, 262 tbl.1 (2011). 
 178. See id. at 262–64; Daphne John & Beth Anne Shelton, The Production of Gender Among 
Black and White Women and Men: The Case of Household Labor, 36 SEX ROLES 171, 188–90 (1997); 
Terri L. Orbuch & Sandra L. Eyster, Division of Household Labor Among Black Couples and White 
Couples, 76 SOC. FORCES 301, 325–26 (1997).  
 179. See, e.g., Sanjiv Gupta, Her Money, Her Time: Women’s Earnings and Their Housework 
Hours, 35 SOC. SCI. RES. 975, 995–96 (2006); Jan Paul Heisig, Who Does More Housework: Rich or 
Poor? A Comparison of 33 Countries, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 74 (2011). 
 180. My thanks to Kimberly Richman for making this point. 
 181. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 30–53 (enlarged ed. 1991).  
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the household develops expertise in the latter.
182
 Conversely, significant 
domestic responsibilities take energy and time away from paid 
employment and can therefore reduce success in that sphere.
183
 Marriage 
law offers (limited) protection to the dependent spouse against 
abandonment by the provider spouse.
184
 Becker initially suggested that 
women were innately better suited to take on responsibilities for childcare 
and for housework due to the biological realities of pregnancy, childbirth, 
and breastfeeding, and that (different-sex) marriages were a societal 
solution to bring together the “complementarity” of male and female skills 
into an efficient familial unit.
185
 In later work, he backed somewhat away 
from this conclusion to suggest that wage discrimination and other factors, 
rather than simply “innate” differences, could play a significant role in 
pushing women to specialize in unpaid work.
186
 Nonetheless, his basic 
premise—that it was maximally efficient for the woman to specialize in 
domestic work and the man to specialize in breadwinning—remained 
unchanged. These ideas retain currency. In 2003, New York Times writer 
Lisa Belkin popularized the concept of an “opt-out revolution” of highly 
educated women rejecting lucrative and often prestigious employment in 
favor of domestic responsibilities and the collective good of their family 
units.
187
 The scope of this “revolution,” as well as the extent to which it is 
dictated by inflexible work/family policies, has been hotly contested.
188
  
In fact, as women entered the paid marketplace in increasing numbers, 
the basic premises of specialization were arguably undermined. If both 
men and women were spending significant hours performing paid work, 
why did women still tend to do the bulk of the housework and caregiving 
responsibilities? Economists and other social scientists developed a group 
 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. See also Joni Hersch, Home Production and Wages: Evidence from the American Time 
Use Survey, 7 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 159 (2009) (demonstrating that housework has a negative 
relation with wages for both women and men). 
 184. BECKER, supra note 181, at 30.  
 185. Id. at 37–38. 
 186. Id. at 54–79. For a recent critique of specialization in the context of family law, see Katharine 
K. Baker, Supporting Children, Balancing Lives, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 359 (2006).  
 187. See Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 2003, http://www.ny 
times.com/2003/10/26/magazine/26WOMEN.html?pagewanted=all. 
 188. See, e.g., Heather Boushey, “Opting Out?” The Effect of Children on Women’s Employment 
in the United States, FEMINIST ECON., Jan. 2008, at 1 (concluding that there is little empirical support 
for claims of a widespread opt-out phenomena); Claudia Goldin, The Quiet Revolution that 
Transformed Women’s Employment, Education, and Family, AM. ECON. REV., May 2006, at 1 
(similar); JOAN C. WILLIAMS ET AL., “OPT-OUT” OR PUSHED OUT?: HOW THE PRESS COVERS 
WORK/FAMILY CONFLICT (2006), available at http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/OptOutPushedOut 
.pdf (analyzing data and the extent to which inflexible policies contribute to women dropping out of 
the workplace). 
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of theories stemming from economic exchange principles to help explain 
this phenomenon. These begin with the premise that housework is 
unpleasant and that, even within a marriage, individuals will bargain with 
their spouses to do less of it if they can.
189
 Therefore, an individual who 
earns more than his spouse will bargain to do less housework, using his 
extra earning power as the leverage in the implicit or explicit deal-making. 
Unlike Becker’s specialization theories, these exchange theories are 
typically presented as sex-neutral. Whichever member of the couple earns 
more should be able to use this leverage to perform less housework.  
In general, men are more likely to have the power in the relationship to 
“bargain out” of housework because they earn more on average than 
women. Despite guarantees of equal treatment in employment law, a 
significant wage gap between men and women persists. Women who work 
full-time earn only about 80 percent of what men who work full-time 
do.
190
 When the comparison includes women who work part-time and/or 
part-year the wage gap widens considerably: a study of workers in their 
prime earning years found that women earn just thirty-eight cents for 
every dollar men earn.
191
 And women tend to marry men a little older than 
they.
192
 This means that when children are born, men tend to be further 
along in their careers and thus earning more than their wives; accordingly, 
if one member of the family is going to curtail work to take on additional 
domestic responsibilities, it generally makes “sense” for it to be the 
woman.
193
 A similar theory focuses on time allocation, suggesting that the 
spouse that spends less time in the paid workforce (again, in most families, 
the woman) will typically perform a greater percentage of the housework; 
often this will correlate with the economic exchange theory, but not 
always.
194
  
But even controlling for such realities, which themselves owe much to 
the historic separate spheres ideology, economic theories do not 
 
 
 189. See, e.g., Sarah Thebaud, Masculinity, Bargaining, and Breadwinning: Understanding Men’s 
Housework in the Cultural Context of Paid Work, 24 GENDER & SOC’Y 330, 332 (2010) (describing 
these economic exchange based theories).  
 190. There are numerous explanations for this wage gap. See generally Michael Selmi, Family 
Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 714–44 (2000) (collecting and discussing 
studies exploring various theories, including human capital factors, individual choice, and statistical 
discrimination). Marriage tends to enhance men’s salaries while it has “a neutral or modestly negative 
effect” on women’s. See id. at 726.  
 191. Heidi Hartmann et al., How Much Progress in Closing the Long-Term Earnings Gap?, in 
THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF GENDER? 125, 131 (Francine D. Blau et al. eds., 2006). 
 192. See RHONA MAHONY, KIDDING OURSELVES: BREADWINNING, BABIES, AND BARGAINING 
POWER 140–42 (1995). 
 193. See id. at 140–41. 
 194. See, e.g., Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, supra note 165, at 772 (collecting studies). 
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adequately explain the housework imbalance in some families. Women 
who earn more than their husbands often still perform a greater share of 
the housework than their husbands—and, even more surprising, several 
studies have found that as the gap in their earnings widens, the gap in the 
housework split also tends to widen.
195
 In other words, these studies 
suggest that a woman who far out-earns her husband will tend to do a 
considerably larger share of the housework than a woman who earns about 
the same amount as her husband.
 
These findings have led to alternative 
theories regarding the division of housework that explicitly focus on 
gender norms. Social scientists speculate that couples in which the woman 
earns more than the man often “correct” for the “gender deviance” by 
embracing a traditional gendered split regarding household 
responsibilities.
196
  
Gender based views help shape the division of responsibility regardless 
of who earns more. Studies have found that couples who hold strongly 
traditional ideas about gender roles—particularly if the male in the couple 
does so—are more likely to assign the bulk of housework or child work to 
the wife, regardless of the split of income earning.
197
 Other researchers 
have found fathers with “feminist attitudes” perform significantly more 
childcare than fathers with more traditional attitudes.
198
 In short, 
traditional expectations regarding appropriate gender roles for men and 
women continue to push women to do a greater share of housework and 
childcare than pure economic theory would predict. Interestingly, some 
research suggests that couples internalize these societal expectations so 
significantly that very unequal divisions of responsibilities—and ones that 
are clearly not inline with the balanced exchange that economic theory 
 
 
 195. See, e.g., Michael Bittman et al., When Does Gender Trump Money? Bargaining and Time in 
Household Work, 109 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 186 (2003); Julie Brines, Economic Dependency, Gender, 
and the Division of Labor at Home, 100 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 652 (1994); Theodore N. Greenstein, 
Economic Dependence, Gender, and the Division of Labor in the Home: A Replication and Extension, 
62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 322 (2000); Thebaud, supra note 189. It may be that this phenomenon is 
receding. See Stephanie Coontz, The M.R.S. and the Ph.D., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at SR1 
(characterizing these findings as “outdated” and referencing a forthcoming paper by Oriel Sullivan, to 
be published by the Council on Contemporary Families, that concludes that the higher a woman’s 
educational resources and earning potential relative to her husband, the more help with housework she 
gets from her partner). 
 196. The phrase “gender deviance” is derived from Greenstein, supra note 195, at 332, 325–26, 
332–34 (discussing “deviant” gender roles and “deviance neutralization” regarding housework 
allocation).  
 197. See, e.g., Yoav Lavee & Ruth Katz, Division of Labor, Perceived Fairness, and Marital 
Quality: The Effect of Gender Ideology, 64 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 27 (2002). 
 198. See, e.g., Charlotte J. Patterson et al., Division of Labor Among Lesbian and Heterosexual 
Parenting Couples: Correlates of Specialized Versus Shared Patterns, 11 J. ADULT DEV. 179, 180 
(2004) (collecting studies). 
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suggests “should” happen—are nevertheless perceived by both members 
of the household as “fair.”199 
As discussed above, law no longer mandates separate spheres for men 
and women. Therefore, it is common to characterize the pervasiveness and 
persistence of gendered divisions of labor as the result of individual 
“choices.” This conclusion is arguably false in several respects. First, as 
discussed in Part II.B, substantive marriage and benefits law still 
encourages specialization. Second, as noted above, both men and women 
face significant pressure to conform to traditional gender norms within 
their relationship. Third, gender norms may also differentially affect how 
employers respond to caretaking obligations by employees. As Joan 
Williams and others have demonstrated, employers may assume, for 
example, that the mother of a young child would not want a promotion 
with significant travel responsibilities, or penalize a male employee who 
seeks to play a greater caregiving role than society expects.
200
 Only 
recently have courts begun to recognize such differential treatment by 
employers as a form of sex discrimination that may be challenged under 
employment discrimination statutes.
201
 More generally, as discussed 
above, existing employment law offers quite limited support for 
employees with caretaking responsibilities.
202
 Thus, a couple who prefers 
to share wage-earning and domestic responsibilities relatively equally but 
finds this difficult because of inflexible workplace rules may gravitate 
towards specialization as a second-best solution.  
Whatever the mix of causes, notwithstanding more than thirty years of 
sex-neutral family law and employment law, most couples continue to 
divide responsibilities along distinctly gendered lines. And, strikingly, 
many state that they prefer it. For example, a recent, large-scale survey, 
found that a slim majority of Americans stated that they believed that it 
was best for society for men to work outside the home and women to 
remain home.
203
 While some studies suggest ongoing movement towards a 
 
 
 199. See, e.g., Michael Braun et al., Perceived Equity in the Gendered Division of Household 
Labor, 70 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1145 (2008). 
 200. See generally Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family 
Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 
HASTINGS L.J. 1311 (2008) (collecting and discussing recent cases and EEOC guidance recognizing 
that employment decisions based on such stereotypes may violate Title VII). 
 201. See, e.g., id. at 1335–41 (discussing recent cases).  
 202. See supra text accompanying notes 146–50. 
 203. John Halpin & Ruy Teixeira, Battle of the Sexes Gives Way to Negotiations, in THE SHRIVER 
REPORT: A WOMAN’S NATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 395, 396, available at http://www.american 
progress.org/issues/2009/10/pdf/awn/a_womans_nation.pdf.  
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normative preference for sharing responsibilities more equally, others 
suggest that this egalitarian preference has leveled off or even receded.
204
  
D. Conflicting Incentives in the Modern Marriage Equation 
The marriage equation framework helps organize and analyze the now 
conflicting incentives that shape how couples choose to allocate 
responsibility for caretaking and breadwinning. The efficacy of policy 
design depends on understanding these interactions. A nascent body of 
social science research uses cross-national comparisons, reflecting 
different policy choices in key aspects of family and employment law, in 
conjunction with the kind of “micro” factors discussed above, to better 
understand the choices couples make.
205
 The challenge, however, is 
properly identifying, and ideally distilling, the crosscurrents at play.
206
 
Alimony reform can provide a particularly striking example of the way 
in which the various factors of the marriage equation interact. Before the 
reforms of the 1970s, in many states alimony was sex-specific. It was 
available upon divorce to wives, not husbands, and generally limited to 
“innocent” wives whose divorces were granted on the basis of a finding 
that their husbands were at fault. It continued the sex-specific requirement 
that husbands provide support to their wives within marriage—alimony 
awards generally continued until either party’s death or until the wife’s 
marriage to a new husband who then assumed the support responsibility.
207
 
Importantly, alimony was far from sufficient to protect divorced women’s 
interests. It was actually awarded relatively rarely;
 
offered no recourse to a 
woman who provided “cause” for the divorce; and often offered 
inadequate support even when awarded.
208
 Certainly, the prior system 
needed reform. 
In the 1970s, alimony changed in two respects. First, after Orr v. 
Orr,
209
 alimony could no longer be limited to dependent wives; the 
 
 
 204. Arland Thornton & Linda Young-DeMarco, Four Decades of Trends in Attitudes Toward 
Family Issues in the United States: The 1960s Through the 1990s, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1009, 
1014, 1032 (2001). 
 205. See Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, supra note 165, at 776–77 (collecting studies).  
 206. Cf. Scott Coltrane, Gender Theory and Household Labor, 63 SEX ROLES 791 (2010) (arguing 
that micro- / macro-research needs to better incorporate gender theory).  
 207. On the history of alimony, see, e.g., Kisthardt, supra note 54.  
 208. See, e.g., LENORE J. WEITZMANN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 144, 457 (1985) (citing 
mid-1970s census reports documenting that 14% of women received alimony); Oldham, supra note 
135, at 429 (citing studies reporting alimony, or alimony or property settlement, rates ranging from 
9.3% to 25% in various periods during the late nineteenth- to mid-twentieth centuries). 
 209. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).  
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evolving understanding of equal protection guarantees mandated that it be 
made available to dependent spouses of either sex.
210
 But rather than 
simply making alimony sex-neutral, many states followed the Uniform 
Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) (originally promulgated in 1970 and 
amended in 1971 and 1973) in renaming alimony “maintenance,” and 
replacing the traditional understanding of alimony as compensation for 
marital fault or an ongoing support obligation with a needs-based 
assessment which limited availability of maintenance to spouses unable to 
support themselves through employment.
211
 Maintenance awards are 
usually temporary, rather than open-ended, designed simply to permit a 
spouse who has not been working to develop employable skills.
212
 Some 
states went even further than the UMDA, adopting statutory time limits on 
maintenance for able-bodied spouses except in instances where a child is 
significantly disabled or incapacitated, and/or prohibitions against 
maintenance awards in relatively short marriages.
213
 In states that adopted 
the UMDA or similar provisions, the focus on demonstrated need means 
that maintenance is typically unavailable in divorces where both members 
of the couple participated in paid work during the marriage, even if the 
 
 
 210. Id.  
 211. See Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, § 308, 9A U.L.A. 347–48 (authorizing awards only 
upon a showing that a spouse lacks “sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs” and “is 
unable to support himself through employment” or the custodian of a child whose “condition or 
circumstances” make it “appropriate” that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside 
the home); Uniform Commercial Code Locator, Uniform Matrimonial and Family Laws Locator, 
available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/vol9.html#mardv (identifying Arizona, Colorado, 
Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Washington as states that adopted the UMDA). 
Other states that are not included on this list adopted provisions that are quite similar to—and 
sometimes more restrictive than—the UMDA. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. 31-15-7-2 (West 2008) 
(basically adopting UMDA standard but adding three year time-limit for many claims); TEX. CODE 
ANN. § 8.051 (limiting availability in marriages of less than ten years). Some UMDA states 
subsequently amended their statutes to expand grounds that could justify awards of maintenance. See, 
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-319.A (permitting maintenance upon showing spouse contributed to 
educational opportunities of other spouse or in marriage of long duration).  
 212. See, e.g., Tonya L. Brito, Spousal Support Takes on the Mommy Track: Why the ALI 
Proposal is Good for Working Mothers, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 151, 155 (2001) (“Temporary 
maintenance awards have become the norm in family law.”); Oldham, supra note 135, at 431 (“[A] 
number of empirical studies from the late 1960s through the 1980s confirm the trend of less frequent 
awards of spousal support, as well as a growing tendency towards support for a fixed term, as opposed 
to support for an indefinite period.”).  
 213. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. 31-15-7-2 (West 2008) (permitting open-ended maintenance to be 
awarded only if a spouse is substantially “physically or mentally incapacitated” or a custodian of a 
child with a substantial “physical or mental incapacity”; and no more than three years of 
“rehabilitative” maintenance to support an able-bodied spouse preparing to reenter or expand paid 
labor force participation); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.051 (generally prohibiting maintenance to able-
bodied spouses not caring for a child with a significant disability if the marriage did not exceed ten 
years).  
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incomes were widely disparate. These reforms fit comfortably with the 
1970s feminists’ efforts to remake marriage as a union of “equals,” and to 
a larger commitment to challenging so-called benevolent protections 
which were, as the Supreme Court observed, “rationalized by an attitude 
of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put women, not on a 
pedestal, but in a cage.”214 The reforms accorded with the move towards 
no-fault divorce which made it more difficult—and many felt conceptually 
troubling—to award alimony as a compensation for spousal misconduct,215 
although a significant number of states retained fault as a factor that could 
be considered in alimony awards.
216
 These changes also interacted with a 
concurrent shift in most states away from title-based distribution of marital 
property, which typically resulted in most marital property being retained 
by the wage-earning husband, to equitable distribution.
217
  
If gender roles had been restructured, and if other aspects of 
substantive marriage law that encourage specialization during the duration 
of the marriage had also been retooled, and particularly if other supports 
(such as publicly subsidized childcare, more generous parental leaves, or 
greater workplace flexibility) had been established, women might have 
begun to participate in paid work on an equal basis with their husbands 
and the changes in alimony might have been considered both successful 
and fair. But that did not happen. Rather, as discussed above, the modern 
marriage equation continues to encourage specialization within marriage, 
although it is now formally agnostic regarding which spouse plays which 
role. Due to the widespread persistence of gender norms, women continue 
to provide the bulk of caregiving within (different-sex) marriages. They 
are far more likely than men to drop out of the paid workforce entirely, to 
work part-time, or, even if working full-time, to prioritize caretaking over 
taking full advantage of their earning power.
218
 Although equitable 
distribution of marital property can partially compensate for such realities, 
 
 
 214. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).  
 215. See, e.g., Kisthardt, supra note 54, at 68 (“With the advent of no-fault divorce, alimony lost 
its punitive rationale.”).  
 216. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 48–51 (research conducted in 1996 concluded that states are divided 
approximately evenly on whether fault could be considered in alimony awards). The UMDA explicitly 
precludes consideration of fault in maintenance awards. See UMDA, § 308(b) (setting forth factors 
that courts should consider in setting a “just [amount] without regard to marital misconduct”). 
 217. See, e.g., Oldham, supra note 135, at 427–29 (discussing historical roots of equitable 
distribution but observing “it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that a majority of noncommunity 
property states enacted equitable distribution statutes or confirmed during that period via judicial 
opinion that divorce courts had this power”). 
 218. See supra Part II.C. 
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many divorcing couples have very little marital property; their greatest 
asset is often the primary wage earner’s income.219 Additionally, upon 
divorce, women are far more likely than men to be granted sole or primary 
physical custody of children, and accordingly family responsibilities 
continue to compromise their ability to maximize their wage-earning 
potential.
220
 The combined effect of these various factors means that, not 
surprisingly, women’s standard of living after divorce often falls 
dramatically, while men’s typically declines modestly or even improves.221  
Changing one aspect of the marriage equation (sex-based open-ended 
alimony eligibility) without changing others (gender norms that expect 
women to be primary caretakers and tax, benefit, and other substantive 
marriage laws that encourage specialization during marriage) upset the 
previous balance. Divorced women, as a group, are probably not worse off 
under the current regime than they would have been under the prior 
alimony regime.
222
 But they did not benefit as much as they might have 
 
 
 219. See, e.g., Oldham, supra note 135, at 433–34 (collecting empirical studies from the 1960s 
through 1980s finding many divorcing couples had little property but that trend toward dividing even 
unvested pension rights may change this analysis to some extent); WILLIAMS, supra note 147, at 121 
(“[I]n the typical case, where a divorcing family has few assets, ‘equal shares’ often means that the 
wife receives an equal share of a nominal amount, or else receives an equal share of the family’s 
mortgage debt.”). 
 220. See, e.g., Douglas W. Allen & Margaret Brinig, Do Joint Parenting Laws Make Any 
Difference?, 8 J. EMP. L. STUDS. 304, 313 tbl.1 (2011) (finding even after Oregon enacted presumption 
of joint custody, mothers were awarded sole custody 59% of the time, fathers were awarded sole 
custody 10% of the time, with the remainder ordering joint custody); Suzanne Reynolds et al., Back to 
the Future: An Empirical Study of Child Custody Outcomes, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1669 (2007) (study 
of North Carolina divorces finding mothers were awarded or obtained through mediation primary 
custody in 232 out of 323 cases, or 72%, of cases, fathers were awarded primary custody in 41 out of 
323 cases, or 13% of cases, with the remainder joint custody). The same study found mothers were 
more likely to obtain primary custody in mediation than in litigation or settlement. See id. 
 221. In 1985, Lenore Weitzmann received widespread attention for studies that showed that 
women experience a 73% decrease in their standard of living after divorce and men experience a 42% 
gain. See WEITZMANN, supra note 208, at 323. Other scholars questioned the magnitude of her 
findings but have generally confirmed that women’s standard of living declines far more than men’s 
after a divorce. See, e.g., Patricia A. McManus & Thomas A. DiPrete, Losers and Winners: The 
Financial Consequences of Separation and Divorce for Men, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 246, 246 (2001) 
(collecting studies showing mixed results on whether men’s standard of living improves or declines 
after divorce but concluding “[a] large body of research has established that marital disruption has a 
substantial negative impact on women’s standard of living, and that this impact is worse for women 
than for men”); id. at 265–66 (“[W]omen and children . . . overwhelmingly suffer serious declines in 
their material well-being in the aftermath of separation and divorce.”). This study found that the 
standard of living for men who had contributed 80% or more of pre-separation income in a marriage 
improved after divorce but that it declined somewhat for men who had been in dual-earner marriages. 
See id. at 266–67; cf. Avellar & Smock, supra note 141 (finding female cohabitors’ economic 
wellbeing declined far more than male cohabitors’ upon dissolution of the relationship).  
 222. See, e.g., Oldham, supra note 135, at 434–35 (“[I]t remains unclear whether it is better for a 
vulnerable spouse today to receive a property settlement and possibly spousal support for a definite 
term, compared to a somewhat more likely award of indefinite spousal support fifty years ago.”). 
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from other reform approaches that more accurately gauged, or accepted, 
the competing incentives embedded in the marriage equation. Notably, 
courts of last resort in several states that did not adopt maintenance 
statutes with time limits have recently reaffirmed that courts may 
appropriately provide open-ended alimony when couples with 
substantially different incomes divorce after a long marriage and the 
dependent spouse cannot be realistically retrained.
223
 Some reform 
proposals go further. For example, in 2002, the American Law Institute 
(ALI) proposed a new standard for maintenance that moves away from the 
expectation that both spouses will participate in the paid marketplace 
during marriage. Instead, the standard would explicitly provide 
“compensation” for a dependent spouse’s “residual loss in earning 
capacity” due to providing a disproportionate share of caretaking, as well 
as any investment in the other spouse’s earning capacity.224 This approach, 
like maintenance, is formally sex-neutral; unlike maintenance, it protects 
spouses (the vast majority of whom are women) who specialize in 
caretaking or who subordinate paid work opportunities to meet domestic 
needs during marriage. No state has yet adopted the ALI 
recommendations, and I am not arguing that the ALI approach is clearly 
superior to the current regime. My claim is far more modest: that 
assessment of the ALI approach, the current regime, or any other potential 
reform, must consider the interaction of all three factors in the marriage 
equation and the extent to which the combination of law and social norms 
continues to encourage women to drop out of the labor force or otherwise 
subordinate their earning power during marriage.
225
  
 
 
 223. See, e.g., Oldham, supra note 135, at 432 n.88 (collecting cases). 
 224. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§§ 5.03(1),(2)(b),(3)(a), 5.05 (2002). The ALI Principles rely heavily on a theory of alimony developed 
by ALI Reporter Ira Ellman. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
The proposal has engendered a significant amount of commentary, some laudatory and some critical. 
See, e.g., Brito, supra note 212 (supporting the proposal on grounds it would create more predictable 
uniform rules and better protect parents who assume primary caregiving responsibilities); June 
Carbone, The Futility of Coherence: The ALI’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 
Compensatory Spousal Payments, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43, 43 (2002) (the proposal deserves “cautious 
support”); Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers as Suckers: Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse, 90 
IOWA L. REV. 1513 (2005) (arguing ALI approach improperly continues to see caretaking as a liability 
and that partnership model would be preferable); Katherine B. Silbaugh, Money as Emotion in the 
Distribution of Wealth at Divorce, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 234 (Robin Wilson ed., 2006) 
(criticizing the proposal’s failure to consider non-financial aspects of marriage).  
 225. Assessment should also be sensitive to differences of class and race. Cf. Twila L. Perry, 
Alimony: Race, Privilege, and Dependency in the Search for Theory, 82 GEO. L.J. 2481 (1994) 
(observing that black women receive alimony at far lower rates than white women and arguing that a 
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More generally, prominent commentators have recently described 
policy efforts to help (different-sex) families better balance work and 
family as “stalled”226 and at an “impasse.”227 To the extent that further 
reform is desirable, it is difficult to know where to put one’s efforts. In 
most different-sex families, economic exchange theories, efficiency gains 
from specialization, and gender norms will tend to reinforce each other. 
Additionally, as noted in Part II.B, the substantive law of marriage and 
related benefits likewise encourages specialization. Disentangling the 
relative significance of these myriad factors is quite difficult, but same-sex 
marriage offers the possibility to consider policy proposals from a fresh 
perspective.  
III. SAME-SEX COUPLES 
Consider the quotation that opened this Article: “It never ceases to 
amaze me how many people will say to us, ‘So, who’s the woman, and 
who’s the man, in your marriage?’”228 This statement helps crystallize the 
confluence of issues that this Article explores. First, it is important to note 
that it is easy to understand what Jason Shumaker means when he says 
“who’s the woman, and who’s the man” in the marriage. The studies 
discussed in Part II.C simply confirm what is common knowledge: Despite 
more than thirty years of formal equality in family law, the role of the 
“woman” and the role of the “man” within marriage remain clear. At the 
same time, the fact that this statement is made by a man who is actually 
married to another man highlights the challenge that same-sex marriage 
poses to these understandings. One or both husbands in the marriage may 
play the role of “woman” in the marriage—that is, perform caretaking 
functions—but in so doing he will be acting against gender norms. This 
can (at least theoretically) weaken the intertwined assumptions that 
caretaking is best performed by a woman and that it is an essential 
expression of femininity. Moreover, it is crucially important that these 
men are legally married under Massachusetts law. Whatever their 
inclinations might be about how best to allocate responsibilities for 
breadwinning and for caregiving, substantive laws and benefits of 
 
 
focus on alimony as a means of providing support for women after divorce may reinforce a hierarchy 
among women in which value depends on association with affluent, more typically white, men).  
 226. Michael Selmi, The Work-Family Conflict: An Essay on Employers, Men and Responsibility, 
4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 573, 573–74 (2007). 
 227. Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law 
and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3, 17, 66 (2010). 
 228. Benoit Denizet-Lewis, supra note 1, at 35. 
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marriage will, at the margins at least, encourage specialization by one 
husband in income-producing work and one husband in domestic work 
rather than an equal split of those responsibilities. These effects may be 
confounded by societal understandings of what marriage “means.” In other 
words, marriage may itself spur one of the men to become the “woman” 
within the relationship.  
As such choices are made not just by this couple but by the rapidly 
growing number of married same-sex couples, researchers will be able to 
develop a much richer understanding of the relative significance of gender 
norms and of the substantive laws of marriage on the way in which 
couples make these decisions.  
A. Challenging the “Last” Sex-Based Classification 
1. Gender Norms in the Debate Over Same-Sex Marriage 
When same-sex couples first brought legal cases seeking the right to 
marry in the early 1970s, their claims (if successful) would have required 
modifications of those aspects of substantive marriage law that imposed 
distinct rights and responsibilities on husbands and on wives.
 
Today, 
however, the formal legal import of the change sought—modification of 
the requirement that marriage be between a man and woman—requires 
only minimal reconsideration of substantive marriage law, since it is now 
sex-neutral in almost all respects. Nonetheless, just as in the debates over 
the ERA, supporters and opponents of same-sex marriage strategically 
claim and disclaim the connections implicit in the marriage equation.  
In 1970, Jack Baker and Michael McConnell were the first gay couple 
in the United States to appeal a denial of a marriage license. Well aware of 
the controversy this would generate, they held a press conference before 
appearing at the clerk’s office in Minneapolis with a crowd of reporters. 
The story was news across the country, and the couple explicitly situated it 
as part of the larger debate over marriage. They characterized their 
objective as seeking recognition for their love—but also as a hope that 
“within five years we can turn the whole institution of marriage upside 
down.”229 Similarly, Paul Barwick and John Singer, a couple who applied 
for a marriage license in Seattle the following year, stated that they sought, 
among other things, to “challenge mainstream definitions of marriage and 
 
 
 229. David L. Chambers, Couples: Marriage, Civil Union, and Domestic Partnership, in 
CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 281, 284 (John D’Emilio et al. 
eds., 2000). 
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the family.”230 Both couples remember being asked repeatedly “which one 
was the wife” and being pleased to emphasize that they were simply two 
men who sought to wed.
231
 In 1971, when Look, a widely read general 
circulation magazine, devoted an issue to the changing American family, it 
included Baker and McConnell as “‘Married’ homosexuals” along with 
profiles of “The Young Unmarrieds” and “The Executive Mother.”232 
Courts in Minnesota and Washington quickly disposed of the gay 
couples’ claims (as did a court in Kentucky faced with a claim brought by 
a lesbian couple), relying primarily on conclusory statements that marriage 
was the union of a man and a woman.
233
 But the possibility—or, in many 
minds, the threat—of gay marriage became intertwined with larger 
questions of gender roles within marriage as part of the increasingly 
virulent debates over the ERA.
234
 Phyllis Schlafly and other opponents of 
the ERA seized on academic musings that suggested the ERA might lead 
to legalization of gay marriage to bolster the case against the ERA.
235
 
Schlafly explicitly linked recognition of gay rights to the traditional 
gender-based assumption that husbands support their families, claiming 
that enactment of the ERA would offer benefits only to “the offbeat and 
 
 
 230. Id.; see also DONN TEAL, THE GAY MILITANTS 291–93 (1971) (discussing varying views on 
the appropriateness of seeking to expand marriage rights for gays and lesbians because of the 
historically patriarchal structure of marriage).  
 231. Chambers, supra note 229, at 286. Likewise, when Tracy Knight attempted to wed Marjorie 
Ruth Jones in Kentucky, the county attorney “became confused during his questioning about which of 
the two was to be the ‘wife’ and who was the ‘husband.’” TEAL, supra note 230, at 290 (quoting Stan 
MacDonald, Two Women Tell the Court Why They Would Marry, LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL, 
Nov. 12, 1970). 
 232. See Jack Star, The Homosexual Couple, LOOK, Jan. 26, 1971, at cover & 69. The pull-quote 
for the article proclaims “[a]s far as Jack Baker and Michael McConnell are concerned, their 
relationship ‘is just like being married.’” Id. at 69. The author carefully explains that the couple 
divides up traditionally feminine tasks according to their individual preferences and skills: “In many 
respects, the Baker-McConnell household is like that of any young marrieds except that there is no 
male-female role-playing. Neither is a limp-wristed sissy. ‘I do the dishes,’ says Baker, ‘because I 
don’t like to cook.’ ‘And I do the cooking, says McConnell, ‘because I cook better than Jack.’” Id. at 
70. The article does however highlight one pertinent difference. It includes a picture of the two men 
shaving, captioned with the observation that their “daily life includes some odd bits of togetherness, 
like shaving.” Id. 
 233. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 
1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).  
 234. For more comprehensive discussions of the role that same-sex marriage played in debates 
over the ERA, see, e.g., MATHEWS & DE HART, supra note 83, at 154 (describing how anti-ERA 
women were jarred by the “apocalyptic future that Schlafly sketched out” for homemakers, combined 
with the “abomination” that the “revolution in gender symbolized by an implicit sanction of 
homosexual marriage” (emphasis in original)); Franklin, supra note 91, at 139–41 (similar); Pascoe, 
supra note 90, at 92–102 (similar); Siegel, supra note 37, at 1390 (arguing Schlafly “linked together 
the ERA, abortion, and homosexuality in ways that changed the meaning of each, and mobilized a 
grassroots, ‘profamily constituency’ to oppose this unholy trinity”).  
 235. SCHLAFLY, supra note 7, at 89–90. 
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the deadbeat male—that is, to the homosexual who wants the same rights 
as husbands, [and] to the husband who wants to escape supporting his wife 
and children.”236 These tactics proved effective. Although supporters of 
the ERA consistently argued that enactment of the amendment would not 
lead to gay marriage,
237
 and in fact it was probably extremely unlikely that 
the Supreme Court of the 1970s would have interpreted the ERA to 
require granting same-sex couples access to marriage, such arguments 
played a key role in defeating the proposed amendment.
238
  
In today’s debate, many opponents of same-sex marriage likewise 
frame their arguments in terms of protecting traditional gender roles. 
Michael Medved, a popular talk-radio host,
239
 is especially explicit about 
the connection. Medved claims that social conservatives often “lose the 
debates before we even begin” by framing gay marriage as a decision 
regarding the validity or morality of homosexual attraction.
240
 He suggests 
instead that the problem with same-sex marriage is that it “undermine[s] 
the crucial importance of gender specific roles in all relationships,” which 
he characterizes as a subject on which “nearly all Americans can agree.”241 
He continues: 
A gay couple might claim that they fill distinctive roles in their 
relationship—with one woman working hard to support the family, 
for instance, while the other cooks and decorates and nourishes the 
kids. But choosing complementary roles for the sake of convenience 
or preference isn’t the same as recognizing that these contrasting 
approaches arise from your very essence as a man or a woman. 
There’s something arbitrary, synthetic and, indeed, temporary about 
 
 
 236. Id. at 95. 
 237. See Pascoe, supra note 90, at 100–01. By 1977, when the National Conference on Women 
was held, supporters of the ERA adopted a platform proclaiming, “ERA will NOT change or weaken 
family structure. . . . ERA will NOT require States to permit homosexual marriage.” See NAT’L 
COMM’N ON THE OBSERVANCE OF INT’L WOMEN’S YEAR, THE SPIRIT OF HOUSTON: THE FIRST 
NATIONAL WOMEN’S CONFERENCE 51 (1978) (emphasis in original). 
 238. Baker and McConnell appealed the denial of a marriage license to them to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, which dismissed their case for “want of a substantial federal question.” Baker v. Nelson, 191 
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).  
 239. Talkers Magazine estimates that Medved reaches approximately 3.75 million listeners per 
week, making him one of the ten most listened-to talk show hosts in the country. See The Top Talk 
Radio Audiences, TALKERS MAG. (Sept. 6, 2011), http://talkers.com/top-talk-radio-audiences.  
 240. Michael Medved, Gender Difference, Not Gay Marriage, at Center of Family Fight, 
TOWNHALL (Aug. 2, 2006), http://townhall.com/columnists/michaelmedved/2006/08/02/gender_ 
difference,_not_gay_marriage,_at_center_of_family_fight/page/full/. 
 241. Id. 
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a same sex couple attempting to imitate a heterosexual marriage by 
fulfilling distinct responsibilities in the relationship.
242
 
Similar themes arise in a Manifesto in support of the “natural family” 
endorsed by several influential conservative leaders.
243
 The Manifesto 
grounds opposition to marriage rights for same-sex couples in a broader 
denunciation of what it calls the “aggressive state promotion of 
androgyny.”244 It decries a range of legal reforms and social changes in the 
latter half of the twentieth century, including “attacks on the meaning of 
‘wife’ and ‘husband’” and the “imposition of full ‘gender equality’ [that] 
destroyed family-wage systems.”245 It embraces an essentialist 
understanding of sex and a separate spheres ideology: young women are to 
grow into “wives, homemakers, and mothers” and young men are to grow 
into “husbands, homebuilders, and fathers.”246 Thus, opposition to gay 
marriage is explicitly framed as part of a larger agenda to roll back modern 
sex discrimination principles and reinstate laws enforcing sex-stereotyped 
gender roles.  
Media campaigns designed in connection with voter referenda on 
same-sex marriage laws have taken this strategy to heart. As Melissa 
Murray explores in detail, advertisements in the campaign in support of 
California’s Proposition 8, a proposal to amend California’s constitution to 
prohibit same-sex marriage, used explicit statements and subtextual gender 
cues to suggest that the opposition to same-sex marriage was not about (an 
arguably inappropriate) homophobia or animus to gay persons but rather 
 
 
 242. Id. (emphasis added). Medved elsewhere characterizes the promotion of marriage rights for 
same-sex couples as “recycl[ing]” the . . . discredited ideas” of “‘Equity Feminists’ of the ’60s and 
’70s” who had argued against gender roles. See Michael Medved, Gay Marriage Recycles Bad Idea, 
TOWNHALL (May 21, 2008), http://townhall.com/columnists/michaelmedved/2008/05/21/gay_marriage 
_recycles_bad_idea/page/full/.  
 243. See Allan C. Carlson & Paul T. Mero, The Natural Family: A Manifesto, FAM. AM., Mar. 
2005, at 1, available at http://familymanifesto.net/fmDocs/FamilyManifesto.pdf. Endorsers include 
Gary Bauer (former leader of the Family Research Council and currently president of American 
Values), the late Jerry Falwell (former leader of the Moral Majority), Phyllis Schlafly (founder of the 
Eagle Forum and, as discussed above, leader of the opposition to the ERA), Nebraska Congressman 
Lee Terry, Rick Warren (evangelical minister and bestselling author), and the late Paul Weyrich (co-
founder of the Heritage Foundation and later leader of the Free Congress Foundation). See Featured 
Endorsements, THE NATURAL FAMILY: A MANIFESTO, http://familymanifesto.net/fm/endorsements 
.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (including an extensive list of endorsers). My thanks to Reva Siegel 
for bringing the Manifesto to my attention. 
 244. Carlson & Mero, supra note 243, at 21. 
 245. Id. at 11. 
 246. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). In a separate section, the Manifesto purports to recognize and 
“believe wholeheartedly in women’s rights,” but it defines these rights as “above all” rights that 
recognize “women’s unique gifts of pregnancy, birthing, and breastfeeding.” Id. at 25. 
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about a (perfectly appropriate) desire to protect gender roles.
247
 For 
example, in one ad, Jan, who likes to cook, and Tom, who enjoys mowing 
the lawn, discuss how friendly they are with their gay neighbors but 
explain that because they “believe[] in and want[] to teach their children 
traditional family values,” they will be voting in favor of Proposition 8.248 
Another ad presents a young girl being raised by a male gay couple. Her 
two fathers are flustered when she asks them, “Where do babies come 
from?” Upon hearing that her friend Megan told her that babies come from 
a mommy and daddy who are married, they suggest that she should spend 
“less time over at Megan’s house,” thereby implicitly excluding their 
daughter from education on traditional gender roles that do not exist in her 
own family. The commercial concludes with a voiceover warning: “Let’s 
not confuse our kids. Protect marriage by protecting the real meaning of 
marriage: only between a man and a woman.”249  
As I have explored in greater detail elsewhere, similar arguments are 
made in legal filings (particularly amicus briefs) in the same-sex marriage 
cases.
250
 One such argument is that men and women, simply by virtue of 
their sex, provide different role models for children and that they play 
“opposite” and “complementary” roles within marriage.251 The other 
argument prominent in recent cases—that marriage is essential to provide 
stability for different-sex couples who may accidentally procreate but not 
for same-sex couples who cannot—is likewise intertwined with gender 
norms.
252
 The fuller explication of the argument focuses on the extent to 
 
 
 247. Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Rights: Parents, the State, and Proposition 8, 
5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 357, 366–90 (2009); see also Kathryn Abrams, Elusive Coalitions: 
Reconsidering the Politics of Gender and Sexuality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1135, 1136–37 (2010) (similar). 
 248. See Proposition 8—Made Simple, YOUTUBE (Oct. 12, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=vI-GjWY-WlA. 
 249. See Proposition 8 Commercial, YOUTUBE (Oct. 25, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=75J3TN9Zzck. 
 250. See Widiss et al., supra note 11, at 487–504. 
 251. See id.; see also Franklin, supra note 91, at 163–70.  
 252. See, e.g., Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 1002 (Wash. 2006) (Johnson, J., concurring 
in judgment) (“Unlike same-sex couples, only opposite-sex couples may experience unintentional or 
unplanned procreation. State sanctioned marriage as a union of one man and one woman encourages 
couples to enter into a stable relationship prior to having children and to remain committed to one 
another in the relationship for the raising of children, planned or otherwise.”); Hernandez v. Robles, 
855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (plurality op.) (“[Same-sex couples] do not become parents as a result of 
accident or impulse. The Legislature could find that unstable relationships between people of the 
opposite sex present a greater danger that children will be born into or grow up in unstable homes than 
is the case with same-sex couples, and thus that promoting stability in opposite-sex relationships will 
help children more.”). See also Edward Stein, The ‘Accidental Procreation’ Argument for Withholding 
Legal Recognition for Same-Sex Relationships, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403 (2009) (discussing 
emergence of this argument and its connection to earlier more general arguments that marriage is 
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which marriage is necessary to protect “vulnerable” women from 
“irresponsible” men who otherwise would abandon them.253 Often these 
claims are couched specifically in terms of the distinct responsibilities of 
“husbands” and “wives.” For example, Monte Stewart, a director of the 
Marriage Law Foundation who has authored numerous briefs in same-sex 
marriage litigation as well as several academic articles, opposes what he 
calls the move to “genderless marriage”254 on the ground that 
“man/woman marriage is the only institution that can confer the status of 
husband and wife, that can transform a male into a husband or a female 
into a wife (a social identity quite different from ‘partner’).”255 Lynn 
Wardle, another academic who has written extensively opposing 
expansion of marriage rights, likewise opines that “[l]egalizing same-sex 
marriage will instantly transform the meaning of marriage, spouse, 
husband, [and] wife.”256  
These arguments have remained strikingly consistent even though the 
legal reality of the claims has changed dramatically. When made in the 
1970s, such arguments reflected the fact that the legal responsibilities of 
husbands and wives were, as discussed above, significantly different. 
Modern claims that recognition of same-sex marriage “threatens” the 
institution of marriage by undermining the meaning of “wife” and 
“husband” should be far less effective because contemporary sex 
discrimination jurisprudence demands that the roles of “wife” and 
“husband” are no longer legally distinct. However, as detailed in Part II.C, 
these terms continue to carry a cultural resonance that is significant, and 
 
 
related to procreation before ultimately concluding the accidental procreation argument is inadequate 
to justify denying marriage rights to same-sex couples). 
 253. See Widiss et al., supra note 11, at 494–98. 
 254. Monte Neil Stewart, Genderless Marriage, Institutional Realities, and Judicial Elision, 1 
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2006). Stewart explains that he chooses this term (“genderless 
marriage”), rather than the more common terms such as same-sex marriage or gay marriage, to 
emphasize that expansion of marriage rights results in a single state-marriage-available to both same-
sex and different-sex couples, rather than a new, different institution of “same-sex marriage.” Id. at 4 
n.6. I agree with his point that it is helpful to emphasize that marriage is a single institution, although I 
believe the shift towards a less gendered understanding of marriage is a positive rather than negative 
development.  
 255. Id. at 19 (emphasis in original). Stewart uses virtually identical language in his briefs. See, 
e.g., Brief for United Families Int’l as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant, at 17–18, 
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (No. 98084), available at http://marriagelaw 
foundation.org/publications/NY%20COA%20Brief.pdf. He does admit, summarizing an argument put 
forward by Nicholas Bala, that the legal significance of these terms has changed dramatically since the 
1970s, Stewart, supra note 254, at 61–63, and further that “socially there is a growing ambiguity about 
the roles of ‘husband’ and ‘wife.’” Id. at 63 (citation omitted).  
 256. Lynn D. Wardle, The Attack on Marriage As the Union of a Man and a Woman, 83 N.D. L. 
REV. 1365, 1377 (2008) (emphasis in original). 
  
 
 
 
 
2012] MARRIAGE EQUATION 777 
 
 
 
 
thus the criticism has a certain logic (whether or not one agrees that it is 
potentially harmful) when one considers the social significance the terms 
still hold. Like rhetoric used to oppose the ERA, these claims reflect a 
conviction—which may well be correct—that one of the best ways to fight 
against changes in formal sex-based classifications (that is, recognition of 
same-sex marriage) is to tap into still widely shared beliefs that men and 
women should play distinct and different roles within marriage. 
Those on the other side of the debate—that is, proponents of expanding 
marriage rights—likewise have considered the connections between sex-
based classifications and gender roles within the marriage equation. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, leaders of the lesbian and gay advocacy and 
scholarly community debated whether it was worth working to broaden 
marriage eligibility. At that time, some of the staunchest proponents of 
same-sex marriage rights supported their case in part on the grounds that it 
would challenge gender norms in marriage more generally. Thomas 
Stoddard, then executive director of Lambda Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, argued that “enlarging the concept” of marriage would “necessarily 
transform it into something new. If two women can marry, or two men, 
marriage—even for heterosexuals—need not be a union of a ‘husband’ 
and a ‘wife.’”257 Paula Ettelbrick, then legal director of the organization, 
disagreed, arguing that seeking marriage rights—and thus necessarily 
contending that gay couples were “just like” heterosexual couples—would 
“begin the dangerous process of silencing our different voices.”258  
A few years later, a conversation between law professors Nan Hunter 
and Nancy Polikoff revisited these same questions.
259
 Hunter, like 
Stoddard, argued that legalizing marriage for same-sex couples “would 
have enormous potential to destabilize the gendered definition of marriage 
for everyone.”260 Same-sex marriage, she contended, “could create the 
model in law for an egalitarian kind of interpersonal relation”261 by 
“rais[ing] the question of what, without gendered content, could the social 
categories of ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ mean.”262 Polikoff, on the other hand, 
contended that rather than transforming the institution of marriage, the 
advent of same-sex marriage would threaten to transform the relationships 
of gays and lesbians. She reviewed evidence gathered by William 
 
 
 257. Stoddard, supra note 13, at 19. He also emphasized practical benefits that would flow from 
marriage. See id. 
 258. Ettelbrick, supra note 14, at 22. 
 259. Hunter, supra note 13; Polikoff, supra note 14. 
 260. Hunter, supra note 13, at 12.  
 261. Id. at 17. 
 262. Id. at 16. 
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Eskridge (as counsel in one of the early second-wave gay marriage cases) 
on same-sex marriage in other cultures that showed that despite being of 
the same sex, the spouses took on distinctly gendered—and distinctly 
hierarchal—roles.263 She predicted that in seeking marriage rights, gays 
and lesbians would minimize the transformative aspect of their claim and 
valorize the current institution of marriage.
264
  
When challenges to different-sex marriage laws began to succeed, the 
gay and lesbian advocacy movement presented a largely unified front in 
support of expanding marriage rights.
265
 At the time of this writing, the 
major national gay and lesbian advocacy organizations have actively 
supported litigation and legislative efforts to expand marriage rights. (As 
noted above, in recent years, some academic commentators and individual 
advocates for lesbian and gay rights have begun once again to question 
publicly the focus on marriage.
266
) But contemporary proponents of 
expanding marriage rights no longer claim that it will transform gender 
roles within different-sex marriages. Rather, in response to oft-stated 
claims that the advent of same-sex marriage would “destroy” the 
“institution” of marriage, advocates have carefully minimized the impact 
of the change they seek. Their consistent argument, particularly in public 
education efforts, lobbying, and the popular press, has been that permitting 
same-sex marriage would in no way affect different-sex marriages.
267
 
Thus, as Courtney Cahill observes, advocates for expansion of marriage 
rights have de-emphasized research showing that same-sex couples do 
tend to differ from different-sex couples, even in ways—like the 
egalitarian division of household responsibilities—that many might find 
normatively attractive.
268
  
 
 
 263. Polikoff, supra note 14, at 1538–40. 
 264. Id. at 1540–41. 
 265. See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 17, at 394 (discussing how advocates within the LGBT 
movement who were once openly skeptical of the value of working to expand marriage rights began 
fighting for marriage once it was framed as the definitive issue of gay and lesbian equality). 
 266. See supra text accompanying notes 24–30. 
 267. See, e.g., FREEDOM TO MARRY, MOVING MARRIAGE FORWARD: BUILDING MAJORITY 
SUPPORT FOR MARRIAGE 5, available at http://www.letcaliforniaring.org/atf/cf/%7B7a706b3a-165f-49 
50-9144-2fc92fe4d8d1%7D/MOVING%20MARRIAGE%20FORWARD%20REPORT.PDF (“When 
talking about the freedom to marry, share the truth: gay couples want to join marriage, not ‘change’ it, 
as opponents like to threaten. . . . [W]e should talk about . . . the same rules, same responsibilities, and 
same respect for all committed couples.”); Talking Points, MARRIAGE EQUALITY RHODE ISLAND, 
http://www.marriageequalityri.org/www/learn/talking_points (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (“The way 
the law defines marriage is to give committed couples the tools they need to care for each other—
opening civil marriage to same-sex couples won’t change that.” (emphasis added)).  
 268. See Courtney Megan Cahill, Celebrating the Differences That Could Make a Difference: 
United States v. Virginia and a New Vision of Sexual Equality, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 943, 969–79 (2009).  
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In a nutshell, the Stoddard/Hunter pro-marriage arguments can be 
characterized as a belief that when “sex” is functionally removed from the 
marriage equation, same-sex couples’ egalitarian gender norms will trump 
both the specialization bias of substantive marriage law and cultural 
understandings of what marriage “means.” And furthermore, by 
demonstrating the possibility of a more egalitarian marriage, same-sex 
marriage can change different-sex marriage. The Ettelbrick/Polikoff 
critique worries by contrast that the specialization bias of substantive 
marriage law and societal understandings of marriage grounded in its 
patriarchal past will trump the relatively egalitarian gender norms of same-
sex couples. Finally, many prominent modern proponents of expanded 
marriage rights simply contend that same-sex marriage is not part of the 
(different-sex) marriage equation at all.  
2. Sex Discrimination Claims in Court 
Given the prevalence of sex-based stereotypes in justifications for 
denying same-sex marriage, one might have expected claims that same-sex 
marriage bans constitute sex discrimination to be successful. This has not 
been the case. As of March 2012, several state courts of last resort have 
held denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples unconstitutional,
269
 but 
none of these decisions relies on sex discrimination rationales.
270
 Rather, 
courts (both those that rule for plaintiffs on other grounds and those that 
deny plaintiffs’ claims entirely) typically conclude that, despite the use of 
sex-based classifications, heightened scrutiny is not merited because men 
and women are disadvantaged equally: Neither (gay) men nor (lesbian) 
women can marry the spouse of their choice.
271
 The putative legal equality 
 
 
 269. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
Additionally, California held a state statute that limited marriage to different-sex couples 
unconstitutional. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), but later held that a 
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage was constitutionally permissible. See Strauss v. 
Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
 270. For detailed discussion of courts’ treatment of sex discrimination claims, see Widiss et al., 
supra note 11, at 468–72. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the sex-based classifications in the 
marriage statute required strict scrutiny and remanded the case to the district court to determine 
whether the state could provide a sufficiently compelling justification. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 
44, 68 (Haw. 1993). The case was subsequently mooted when Hawaii enacted a constitutional 
amendment limiting marriage in the state to the union of a man and a woman. See HAW. CONST. art. 1, 
§ 23. 
 271. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10 (N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he restriction of marriage 
to opposite-sex couples is subject only to rational basis scrutiny . . . [because it] does not put men and 
women in different classes, and give one class a benefit not given to the other.”); Andersen v. King 
Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 988 (Wash. 2006) (holding that because “[m]en and women are treated 
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of husbands and wives is used as grounds to reject sex-stereotyping 
claims. Courts reason that the separate spheres ideology is no longer 
enforced in law and the prior reform of marriage law is not relevant to the 
current debate.
272
  
Elsewhere, I have argued that these conclusions are unfounded. 
Arguments against same-sex marriage are permeated with assumptions 
about appropriate gender roles. These justifications should be recognized 
as inadequate under anti-stereotyping doctrine.
273
 But the fact that courts 
embrace these justifications—e.g., that it is a “commonsense premise that 
children will do best with a mother and a father in the home”274—helps 
highlight just how natural such gendered assumptions still seem. Courts 
also reaffirm the significance of sex-based classifications in their 
substantive Due Process analysis. In that context, courts consistently hold 
that “marriage” is “fundamental” because it is “deeply rooted in the 
Nation’s history and tradition,” but that a separate status they call “same-
sex marriage” is not.275 In other words, they reify the man/woman aspect 
of marriage as inherent to the meaning of marriage. 
The district court decision in Perry v. Schwarzenegger (now Perry v. 
Brown),
276
 the federal court challenge to California’s Proposition 8, is an 
important exception to the approach described above. The district court 
reviewed copious historical evidence.
277
 It concluded that the core of the 
right to “marriage” has been and remains the right to “choose a spouse 
and, with mutual consent, join together and form a household,” and 
changes in the racial and sex-based requirements associated with marriage 
 
 
identically under [the state’s] DOMA” it does not discriminate on the basis of sex). As Mary Anne 
Case argues persuasively, this matter-of-fact acceptance of such “equal” classifications is out of line 
with sex discrimination decisions in other contexts. See Case, supra note 17, at 1219–21.  
 272. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999) (“It is one thing to show that 
long-repealed marriage statutes subordinated women to men within the marital relation. It is quite 
another to demonstrate that the authors of the marriage laws excluded same-sex couples because of 
incorrect and discriminatory assumptions about gender roles or anxiety about gender-role confusion.”); 
Andersen, 138 P.3d at 989 (“[T]here is nothing in [the state’s] DOMA that speaks to gender 
stereotyping within marriage.”). 
 273. See Widiss et al., supra note 11, at 487–504. 
 274. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 8; see also, e.g., Andersen, 138 P.3d at 983 (similar); id. at 1005–
06 (Johnson, J., concurring in judgment) (“[B]ecause of the nonfungible differences between men and 
women, . . . [same-sex marriage’s] differences from the optimum mother/father setting for stable 
family life may offer distinctive disadvantages.”). 
 275. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 9; see also, e.g., Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 207, 209 (N.J. 
2006) (same); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 976, 978 (same). For a more detailed discussion of this analysis, 
see Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 23, at 1391–93. 
 276. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), affirmed sub nom. 
Perry v. Brown. 
 277. See id. 
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have not changed this core meaning.
278
 The court therefore held that the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage was “an artifact of a time 
when the genders were seen as having distinct roles in society and in 
marriage.”279 Accordingly, the court rejected proponents’ claim that the 
plaintiffs in the case sought a “new right” to same-sex marriage, 
explaining rather that they sought the same thing “opposite-sex couples 
across the state enjoy—namely, marriage.”280 I believe this approach 
appropriately recognizes the interrelationship of Due Process analysis with 
sex-discrimination analysis, but the Perry court stands virtually alone in its 
approach. Notably, although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
judgment that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional, it did so on the 
relatively narrow ground that there was no legitimate justification for 
stripping from same-sex couples the right to marry that the state had 
previously permitted; the Ninth Circuit did not reach the broader question 
of whether simply denying marriage rights to same-sex couples violates 
the Constitution, and accordingly it did not address the lower court’s Due 
Process or sex discrimination analysis.
281
 At the time of this writing, it 
remains to be seen whether the U.S. Supreme Court will consider the 
issue. 
B. Disaggregating Gender 
Contemporary advocates of expanded marriage rights are reluctant to 
suggest that recognition of same-sex marriages will change different-sex 
marriages.
282
 This may well be a smart strategy from litigation, public 
relations, and fundraising perspectives—and it certainly is an 
understandable response to the apocalyptic claims of those opposing 
expansion of marriage rights. But now that same-sex marriage exists, these 
previously academic debates have on-the-ground significance. They are no 
longer abstract musing about gender roles. Rather, they are the day-to-day 
decisions made by (newly married) same-sex couples around the country. 
Will one husband drop out of the paid workforce to stay home with 
children while the other husband provides income? Will one wife focus on 
advancing her career while the other wife provides domestic support? 
 
 
 278. Id. at 993. 
 279. See id.  
 280. See id. 
 281. See Perry v. Brown, No. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 2328, at *16-*18 (9th 
Cir. Feb. 7, 2012). 
 282. See supra notes 267–68 and accompanying text. 
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Simply asking the questions highlights the potentially transformative 
impact of the reality.  
This transformation could occur in two ways. The first—and the one 
that is typically assumed by opponents of same-sex marriage—is that the 
mere fact of state recognition of same-sex marriage will weaken the 
gendered understanding of spousal roles within different-sex marriages. 
This likewise was the position advanced by earlier proponents of same-sex 
marriage such as Thomas Stoddard and Nan Hunter.
283
 A few researchers 
have tried to assess whether such effects exist by studying European 
countries where legal recognition of same-sex relationships (often not 
called marriages) predates recognition of such relationships in the United 
States. Some have claimed to find significant effects; others find little or 
no effect.
284
  
The second way that the new reality of same-sex marriage could 
change marriage is by permitting enhanced understanding of the relative 
importance of gender norms compared to substantive marriage law in how 
couples make decisions, particularly decisions related to the allocation of 
income-producing and caregiving responsibilities. Whether or not the 
simple existence of same-sex married couples will transform gender roles, 
the new reality of same-sex marriage offers a natural experiment that 
can—and I think should—inform policy debates regarding marriage more 
generally. In other words, it offers the possibility of pulling apart the 
marriage equation.  
This premise begins by recognizing that in different-sex couples, it is 
often difficult to disaggregate the relative significance of efficiency gains 
from specialization, economic exchange dynamics, and gender pressures, 
since they all tend to mutually reinforce a traditional gendered divide 
within a family. Same-sex relationships therefore offer the opportunity to 
help identify the distinct roles that sex, gender, and societal expectations 
play in the division of responsibilities within families. In 1983, Philip 
Blumstein and Pepper Schwartz published a book with the results of the 
first large-scale study of married (heterosexual) couples, unmarried 
 
 
 283. See supra notes 257, 260 and accompanying text.  
 284. Compare Stanley Kurtz, The End of Marriage in Scandinavia: The “Conservative Case” for 
Same-Sex Marriage Collapses, 9 WEEKLY STANDARD, Feb. 2, 2004, at 26 (claiming recognition of 
same-sex marriage contributed to declining marriage rates for heterosexual couples), and M. Van 
Mourick et al., Good for Gays, Bad for Marriage, NATIONAL POST, Aug. 11, 2004, at A16 (similar), 
with WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE? 
WHAT WE’VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE (2006) (finding small positive effects on culture of 
marriage following recognition of same-sex relationships), and BADGETT, supra note 8, at 64–85 
(finding little to no effects on marriage behavior or beliefs of heterosexuals). 
  
 
 
 
 
2012] MARRIAGE EQUATION 783 
 
 
 
 
heterosexual couples, and same-sex couples in long-term relationships.
285
 
They found that most heterosexual married couples still divided 
responsibilities along distinctly gendered lines; same-sex couples, by 
contrast, divided housework and decision-making more equally. The 
authors noted, however, that same-sex couples accordingly lost some of 
the “efficienc[ies]” associated with traditional gender roles.286  
Numerous studies conducted more recently have likewise found that 
lesbian and gay couples divide housework much more equally than 
different-sex couples.
287
 As one researcher put it, “[A]lthough members of 
gay and lesbian couples do not divide household labor in a perfectly equal 
manner, they are more likely than members of heterosexual couples to 
negotiate a balance between achieving a fair distribution of household 
labor and accommodating the different interests, skills, and work 
schedules of particular partners.”288 One of the most detailed examinations 
is a study that compared same-sex couples who registered for civil unions 
during the first year that they were legalized in Vermont with their married 
heterosexual siblings.
289
 The researchers determined that, as they expected, 
the lesbian and gay couples divided responsibility for housework 
considerably more equally than heterosexual couples; in fact, referring to 
the various economic and gender-related theories put forth to explain 
different-sex couples’ division of responsibilities, the researchers observed 
that sexual orientation was a stronger predictor of equality of division than 
income. That is, same-sex couples with significantly different incomes not 
only divided house work more equally than different-sex couples with 
significantly different incomes, but also more equally than different-sex 
couples with similar incomes.
290
  
 
 
 285. See PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES (1983). 
 286. Id. at 324–25. 
 287. See, e.g., Letitia Anne Peplau & Leah R. Spalding, The Close Relationships of Lesbians, Gay 
Men, and Bisexuals, in CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS: A SOURCEBOOK 111 (2000) (collecting studies); 
Letitia Anne Peplau & Adam W. Fingerhut, The Close Relationships of Lesbians and Gay Men, 58 
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 405 (2007) (same); Mally Shechory & Riva Ziv, Relationships between Gender 
Role Attitudes, Role Division, and Perception of Equity Among Heterosexual, Gay and Lesbian 
Couples, 56 SEX ROLES 629, 630 (2007) (same). 
 288. Lawrence A. Kurdek, What Do We Know About Gay and Lesbian Couples?, 14 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 251, 252 (2005); see also Lawrence A. Kurdek, The Allocation of 
Household Labor by Partners in Gay and Lesbian Couples, 28 J. FAM. ISSUES 132 (2007) (similar). 
 289. See Solomon et al., supra note 19, at 572. 
 290. See id. Notably, since the heterosexual couples included a sibling of the gay or lesbian 
couple, the background and upbringing was similar for at least half of each couple, “rais[ing] questions 
about how women and men are socialized to assume gendered roles in adult relationships.” Id. at 573. 
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Many studies of lesbian parents also find that they share childcare 
responsibilities considerably more equally than different-sex parents.
291
 
For example, one study that looked specifically at lesbian couples 
transitioning into parenthood recorded consistent efforts by the couples to 
develop special “mothering” opportunities for the non-biological mom, 
such as taking on bath-time routines.
292
 In sharp contrast to different-sex 
couples, where the birth of a child often signals not only a decrease in the 
mother’s paid work hours but an increase in the father’s, several of the 
couples reported that both the biological and the non-biological mother 
decreased paid work hours to better accommodate childcare 
responsibilities.
293
 Another study, which compared lesbian couples raising 
children to heterosexual couples, likewise found that lesbian mothers in a 
couple each tended to spend about the same number of hours each week in 
paid employment and to split childcare responsibilities relatively equally, 
while in heterosexual families, fathers spent twice as much time in paid 
employment as their wives and considerably less time providing direct 
childcare.
294
 Although there are far fewer studies of gay male parents, 
several also find relatively co-equal parenting.
295
  
Of course, these findings do not mean gender does not matter in same-
sex couples. Rather, they simply suggest that when both members of the 
couple are the same sex and thus receive similar gendered “conditioning,” 
they may more readily share responsibilities both within and outside the 
home more equally. Same-sex couples typically state that their normative 
ideal is equal sharing of home and work responsibilities, although this may 
also depend in part on dimensions of race and class.
296
  
 
 
 291. See, e.g., Timothy J. Biblarz & Evren Savci, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender 
Families, 72 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 480 (2010) (collecting studies); Charlotte J. Patterson, Family 
Relationships of Lesbians and Gay Men, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1052, 1054 (2000) (same); Peplau & 
Fingerhut, supra note 287, at 415 (same). 
 292. See Abbie E. Goldberg & Maureen Perry-Jenkins, The Division of Labor and Perceptions of 
Parental Roles: Lesbian Couples Across the Transition to Parenthood, 24 J. SOC. & PERS. 
RELATIONSHIPS 297, 308–09 (2007). 
 293. Id. at 314. 
 294. Charlotte J. Patterson et al., Division of Labor Among Lesbian and Heterosexual Parenting 
Couples: Correlates of Specialized Versus Shared Patterns, 11 J. ADULT DEV. 179, 187 (2004). The 
researchers also found that despite similar educational background, heterosexual mothers had less 
prestigious paid work than heterosexual fathers or than lesbian mothers. Id. 
 295. See, e.g., SUZANNE M. JOHNSON & ELIZABETH O’CONNOR, THE GAY BABY BOOM 156–58 & 
tbl.9.5 (2002) (finding gay male couples reported dividing childcare responsibilities relatively 
equally); Biblarz & Savci, supra note 291, at 487 (collecting studies showing relatively equal sharing). 
 296. See, e.g., Patterson et al., supra note 294, at 183; but cf. Mignon R. Moore, Gendered Power 
Relationships among Women: A Study of Household Decision Making in Black, Lesbian Stepfamilies, 
73 AM. SOC. REV. 335, 343, 348 (2008) (suggesting this may differ for black lesbians). 
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There have been a handful of studies that suggest greater levels of 
specialization within gay and lesbian couples than the studies discussed 
above. A review of California census data found that about the same 
percentage of same-sex and different-sex couples raising children had only 
one wage earner.
297
 Some studies have found that in lesbian couples where 
one mother is biologically related to the child, it is relatively common for 
her to take on greater childcare responsibilities, even after biological 
differences—such as ability to breastfeed—are no longer salient.298 A 
recent study of black lesbians in “step-parent” relationships (that is, where 
children were born in a prior heterosexual relationship) concluded that 
these couples were less likely than their white lesbian counterparts to pool 
financial resources or to divide childcare or domestic responsibilities 
equally.
299
 Specialization may occur even without these child-related 
distinctions. An older qualitative study of fifty-two long-term gay and 
lesbian couples, very few of whom had children, found quite high levels of 
specialization.
300
  
Such findings of specialization within gay and lesbian couples merit 
further exploration. Key factors to consider may be the extent to which 
race, class, duration of relationships, age or age differential between 
members of the couple, genetic or gestational relationships (or lack 
thereof) to children, or “step-parent” relationships may affect couples’ 
decision-making regarding the allocation of domestic responsibilities. 
Methodological distinctions may also be important. For example, one 
researcher suggests his findings of relatively high levels of specialization 
 
 
 297. See Gary J. Gates, CENSUS SNAPSHOT: CALIFORNIA LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL 
POPULATION 4 (2008), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-
Ramos-CA-Snapshot-Oct-2008.pdf (finding 39% of same-sex couples raising children included only 
one wage earner, compared with 42% of different-sex couples). These rates are both very high 
compared to national averages. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING 
ARRANGEMENTS: 2007 14 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-
fam/p20-561.pdf (24% of married-couple family groups included a stay-at-home mother). The national 
study does not calculate the percentage of married family groups that included a stay-at-home father, 
but estimates that there are 165,000 families with a stay-at-home father, a tiny fraction of the 
approximately 5.6 million families with a stay-at-home mother. See id. at n.19. In part, the difference 
between the California figures and the national figures may reflect different terminology, since the 
U.S. census study also finds that 34% of married couples with children had only one wage earner. 
 298. See Jordan B. Downing & Abbie E. Goldberg, Lesbian Mothers’ Constructions of the 
Division of Paid and Unpaid Labor, 21 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 100 (2011); see also Biblarz & Staci, 
supra note 291, at 483 (collecting studies). 
 299. See Moore, supra note 296. 
 300. CHRISTOPHER CARRINGTON, NO PLACE LIKE HOME: RELATIONSHIPS AND FAMILY LIFE 
AMONG LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 184–206 (1999). Carrington classified thirteen of the families as 
achieving a rough “parity” in their domestic obligations and thirty-eight in which one member of the 
couple specialized in domestic work. Id. at 184, 187. 
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may stem in part from shadowing his subjects and conducting back-to-
back interviews, rather than relying on self-reports or joint interviews, 
which can be subject to purposeful or inadvertent distortions.
301
 He 
proposed that the phenomenon of correcting for “gender deviance,” 
documented in different-sex couples,
302
 may play in reverse for same-sex 
couples, with such couples “correcting” for gender deviance by claiming 
the split is more equal than it actually is.
303
 And, as further discussed 
below, the existence of legal marriage, other legal statuses (such as civil 
unions), or non-legal commitment ceremonies may affect the likelihood of 
specialization as well. 
Despite such variation, it is fair to conclude that the majority of current 
studies find that same-sex couples share responsibilities for childrearing 
and for housework more equally than different-sex couples, and that they 
also tend to work more equal hours outside the home. Thus, naturally, 
researchers have suggested that gay and lesbian couples may be a model 
for different-sex couples. The Vermont researchers, for example, suggest 
that “[s]ame-sex couples are a model for ways of equalizing the division of 
housework.”304 These echo the claims made a generation ago by Thomas 
Stoddard and Nan Hunter that recognition of marriage rights for same-sex 
couples could help upend the separate spheres mentality for different-sex 
couples.
305
 Although, as noted above, current advocates for marriage rights 
tend to eschew such arguments, a few commentators in the popular press 
have picked up on this theme.
306
 There is potential here—but it may be 
illusory. These claims overlook a key factor that is generally ignored: the 
data sets used in these studies uniformly predate legal marriage for same-
sex couples.  
C. Disaggregating Marriage 
The empirical and qualitative studies described in the previous sub-part 
typically compare heterosexual married couples to same-sex couples in 
long-term relationships. These differ in two significant ways. The first, 
and the one that has been the focus of the studies, is obviously whether the 
members of the couple are of the same or different sexes. The second 
distinction is whether the couple is married or not. Although the latter 
 
 
 301. Id. at 176. 
 302. See MAHONEY, supra note 192. 
 303. See CARRINGTON, supra note 300, at 52–53, 216–18. 
 304. Solomon et al., supra note 19, at 572. 
 305. See supra notes 257, 260–62 and accompanying text. 
 306. See, e.g., Parker-Pope, supra note 19; Belkin, supra note 19.  
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distinction is rarely considered significant in the study design, and in fact 
is often completely ignored, it may be an important factor.
307
 None of the 
data sets used in the studies described in the previous part include married 
same-sex couples.
308
 That is likely soon to change. A rapidly growing 
number of states permit same-sex couples to marry or have created a 
status, such as civil union or domestic partnership, that provides all of the 
state-level benefits of marriage. As of March 2012, Connecticut, Iowa, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and 
Washington, as well as the District of Columbia, have legalized same-sex 
marriage, and California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, 
Oregon, and Rhode Island have state laws providing the equivalent of 
spousal rights to same-sex couples within the state.
309
 Even before New 
York legalized same-sex marriage in the summer of 2011, researchers 
estimated that approximately 50,000 same-sex couples in this country had 
married, and that another 85,000 same-sex couples had entered civil 
unions or domestic partnerships.
310
 New York’s enactment of marriage 
legislation doubled the percentage of same-sex couples living in states that 
permit them to marry.
311
  
The new reality thus offers significant potential for disaggregating the 
elements of the marriage equation to better understand the relative 
significance of each factor in how couples make decisions. The studies 
discussed in Part III.B, showing that same-sex couples are more likely 
than different-sex couples to participate equally in the workforce and to 
 
 
 307. A few studies mention the absence of legal marriage as a potential factor that merits future 
study. See, e.g., Patterson et al., supra note 198, at 188. Lee Badgett offers a fuller discussion of the 
possible implication of the absence of the legal benefits of marriage on the specialization—or lack 
thereof—of lesbian couples. See M. V. LEE BADGETT, MONEY, MYTHS, AND CHANGE: THE 
ECONOMIC LIVES OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 160–63 (2001).  
 308. The Solomon et al., supra note 19, study of members of civil unions in Vermont is a partial 
exception, since civil unions provide the rights and benefits of marriage, albeit without the actual 
moniker of “marriage.” However, Vermont does not have a residency requirement for eligibility for 
civil unions and, since Vermont was the first state to recognize a legal status comparable to marriage, 
many out-of-state couples registered for civil unions. Id. at 561–62. Accordingly, only one-fifth of the 
couples in the study were from Vermont. Id. at 564. At the point where the study was conducted, no 
other state recognized civil unions as granting the benefits of marriage under state law. Thus, the vast 
majority of study participants had minimal or no legal benefits from their civil union status.  
 309. See sources cited supra note 16. Additionally, Colorado, Maine, and Wisconsin provide at 
least some of the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples that register as domestic partners. See 
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, supra note 16. 
 310. See Press Release, Williams Inst., supra note 15. 
 311. Press Release, Williams Inst., Extending Marriage to Same-Sex Couples in New York Will 
Impact Over 42,000 Couples Raising 14,000 Children in the State (June 15, 2011), available at 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/press/press-releases/extending-marriage-to-same-sex-couples-in-
new-york-press-release-jun-2011. 
  
 
 
 
 
788 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:721 
 
 
 
 
divide household responsibilities equally, may simply reflect the necessity 
that as an unmarried couple, each individual will do more to “look out” for 
his or her own interests. The absence of a legal union could also make it 
prohibitively expensive or impossible to achieve certain benefits that can 
flow from specialization in different-sex married couples.
312
 If this is the 
case, the more rights of marriage that same-sex couples can access, the 
more likely one would begin to see a division of responsibilities—
including one member of a family dropping out of, or minimizing 
participation in, the paid workforce—that mirror those of heterosexual 
married couples. At the margins, at least, the combination of substantive 
marriage laws and tax and benefits policies will push a couple towards 
specialization.
313
 
Future studies that use data from same-sex couples who are married 
thus can greatly increase our understanding of the relative importance of 
such legal rights. Significantly, it is not possible to fully compare same-
sex married couples to different-sex married couples because the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) denies same-sex couples the many 
federal benefits of marriage.
314
 The U.S. General Accounting Office has 
determined that there are 1,138 federal statutes that reference marriage; 
DOMA provides that same-sex couples are not recognized as “married” in 
any of these contexts.
315
 This means, among other things, that same-sex 
couples cannot file their federal taxes as a married couple, are not eligible 
for social security spousal benefits, and cannot sponsor a spouse for 
immigration status. (For any given couple, the inapplicability of federal 
law may not be an unmitigated disadvantage. For example, as discussed 
above, under federal law, some married couples face a “marriage penalty” 
relative to the amount that they would pay as single persons;
316
 thus, for 
 
 
 312. The specific tax, pension, social security, and welfare benefits discussed above are simply 
unavailable to same-sex couples who cannot marry. Some of the other benefits of marriage, 
particularly upon divorce or death, may be achieved through private contract. This is expensive and 
time-consuming. Further, to the extent that a couple disagrees (for example, a breadwinning spouse 
might be unwilling to pre-commit to income-sharing upon divorce), the shift from the legal default 
applied in marriage—income earned during a marriage is shared—to the legal default applied to 
cohabitors—income earned during a marriage is separate—can be quite significant. See supra text 
accompanying notes 140–41. 
 313. Importantly, this may be true whether or not couples identify accessing legal rights as a key 
reason for their choice to marry. Cf. Kimberly D. Richman, By Any Other Name: The Social and Legal 
Stakes of Same-Sex Marriage, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 357, 367–69, 372–77 (2010) (reporting that in 
interviews, same-sex couples typically identified legal rights as comparatively less important than love 
and public validation in reasons they chose to marry).  
 314. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
 315. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 47. 
 316. See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text. 
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same-sex married couples with relatively equal incomes, the inability to 
file joint federal taxes may actually reduce the aggregate amount of taxes 
they owe, as well as permit them to engage in a range of other tax-
avoidance strategies.
317
) DOMA also permits states to refuse to recognize 
out-of-state marriages between persons of the same sex, meaning that if 
same-sex couples move from a jurisdiction that permits marriage to one 
that does not, they will no longer have the state benefits of marriage 
either.
318
  
In July 2010, a federal district court held that the portions of DOMA 
that preclude federal recognition of same-sex marriages are 
unconstitutional.
319
 President Obama has since declared that his 
administration would no longer defend the constitutionality of those 
provisions in pending challenges,
320
 although U.S. House of 
Representatives’ Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group has stepped in to make 
the defense.
321
 The ultimate resolution of these cases is uncertain. The 
demise of DOMA would obviously be a significant benefit for same-sex 
married couples, and one that I believe is warranted under existing 
constitutional principles and as a matter of good policy. That said, the 
current moment, when the federal benefits of marriage are not available, 
offers the opportunity, which may be fleeting, to compare the relative 
significance of aspects of federal law that push couples towards 
specialization and aspects of state law that do. If decisions striking down 
the provisions of DOMA that limit access to federal benefits are upheld, or 
if DOMA were repealed, there would be greater opportunity for a true 
comparison between different-sex and same-sex married couples, but 
researchers would lose the possibility to probe the relative significance of 
the state versus federal factors. Accordingly, studies completed in the 
 
 
 317. See generally Theodore Soto, The Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1529 (2008) (demonstrating how gay couples could arrange their affairs to pay federal 
income taxes at significantly lower rates than different-sex couples with the same economic 
circumstances).  
 318. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
 319. See Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010), appeal pending; 
Massachusetts v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010), appeal 
pending. A handful of other lower courts have likewise held that this section of DOMA is 
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Golinski v. United States Office of Personal Mgmt., No. C-10-00257 (N.D. 
Ca. Feb. 22, 2012), appeal pending;  In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 576 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011). There 
are several other pending cases.  
 320. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation 
Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
2011/February/11-ag-222.html.  
 321. Letter from John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House, to Nancy Pelosi, Democratic Leader of 
the House (Apr. 18, 2011), available at http://www.speaker.gov/UploadedFiles/DOMALetter.pdf. 
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current legal regime may be a helpful counterpoint to future studies if 
DOMA is repealed or struck down as unconstitutional.  
The current variability in legal recognition among states should also 
encourage the development of studies that probe in a more fine-grained 
manner how the discrete elements of “marriage” may impact couples’ 
decision-making. That is, this Article has focused primarily on the 
substantive legal rights and benefits afforded by marriage law. Marriage 
also carries significant social meaning, what might be characterized as the 
“expressive value” of marriage. And marriage is a statement by a couple to 
each other that they are committed to a long-term, ideally life-long, 
relationship. When different-sex couples marry, they simultaneously enjoy 
all of these aspects of marriage, and all three likely play a role in how 
couples choose to allocate responsibilities.
322
 A couple might choose to 
specialize into breadwinning and caregiving roles not only because the 
substantive rights and benefits of marriage law encourage it, but also 
because they have committed to each other that they will function as an 
integrated family unit for the foreseeable future, and because societal 
understandings of marriage endorse this choice as permissible and, for 
many, normatively desirable.  
In states where same-sex couples are permitted to actually marry, they, 
like different-sex couples, gain access to all three aspects of marriage 
(with the important caveat, discussed above, that they do not enjoy the 
federal benefits of marriage). In states where same-sex couples are 
permitted to form civil unions or domestic partnerships, but are not 
permitted to marry, they achieve the rights and benefits of marriage, and 
they make the commitment to each other, but they enjoy less of the 
expressive value. In states that permit neither marriage nor access to a 
comparable legal status, same-sex couples may nonetheless choose to 
celebrate their union with a commitment ceremony or private marriage. 
These couples are consciously making a commitment to each other, but 
they are not obtaining the legal rights and benefits of marriage (although 
they may duplicate some of them through private contract law), and they 
do not obtain the full expressive value of marriage. Studies could be 
designed that use the existing “laboratory of the states” to better 
understand the relative significance of the legal, social, and personal 
aspects of marriage. This too may be a time-limited opportunity. The 
federal challenge to California’s Proposition 8 may well reach the U.S. 
 
 
 322. See, e.g., Niko Matouschek & Imran Rasul, The Economics of the Marriage Contract: 
Theories and Evidence, 51 J. LAW & ECON. 59, 63–65 (2008) (collecting studies seeking to evaluate 
the social, commitment, and signaling-benefits that marriage provides).  
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Supreme Court. If the Court were to find that California’s law was 
unconstitutional on grounds that invalidated other states’ bans, the 
variation among states would quickly end. Again, as a matter of 
constitutional law and fundamental fairness, I believe this would be 
appropriate, but it would foreclose a fruitful line of potential research.  
The extent of legal recognition of marriage and derivative benefits is 
not the only factor that could affect how same-sex versus different-sex 
married couples divide responsibilities. One of the most important 
differences may be the rate of childrearing. Although some studies have 
found that the proportion of lesbian households with children is 
comparable to the proportion in heterosexual women’s households, others 
report lower rates.
323
 And gay male households are less likely to have 
children.
324
 Since specialization among different-sex couples increases 
dramatically as children enter the equation, and also varies with the 
number of children a couple is raising, this could be a very significant 
factor. It would interact dynamically, however, with the advent of 
marriage rights, especially since many same-sex couples seek to marry 
precisely to obtain protections for children. 
Additionally, as noted above, same-sex marriages are not immune from 
societal pressures related to gender roles. Engrained gender-based 
assumptions may put pressure on same-sex couples just as they do on 
different-sex couples. It could be that on average gay male couples react to 
these possibilities differently from female lesbian couples. That is, perhaps 
studies will show that gay male couples will more typically both work 
full-time jobs and outsource domestic obligations, while lesbian couples 
will more typically both work part-time jobs and share childcare and 
domestic responsibilities.
325
 Or more strikingly, it could be the opposite.
326
 
This offers an additional opportunity for analyzing, in a different way, the 
relative significance of gender compared to marriage in both same-sex and 
different-sex relationships.
327
  
The complex way in which legal marriage interacts with social norms, 
and the extent that this could affect results, would also need to be 
 
 
 323. See, e.g., BADGETT, supra note 307, at 153–55 (collecting studies). 
 324. See id. 
 325. Cf. CARRINGTON, supra note 300, at 186–87 (discussing relatively young male-couples that 
rely on the service economy for domestic needs).  
 326. See Ginia Bellafante, Two Fathers, with One Happy to Stay at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 
2004, at A1, A1 (citing research based on census reports that 26% of gay male couples, 25% of 
different-sex couples, and 22% of lesbian couples include a stay-at-home parent). 
 327. See also Schacter, supra note 17, at 400–01 (making a similar point).  
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considered.
328
 For example, imagine that a study of same-sex married 
couples in Massachusetts found higher rates of specialization than earlier 
studies of unmarried same-sex couples. This could support my 
hypothesis—that is, that legal marriage encourages specialization. Or it 
could be that those gay couples who choose to marry are, on average, 
more drawn to a relationship that embraces specialization than the gay 
population studied before legalization of marriage;
329
 in fact, some 
individuals who were not open about their sexual orientation before 
legalization of marriage might come out post-legalization. On the other 
hand, some gay couples who marry might consciously desire to challenge 
the traditional institution of marriage, or as earlier advocates put it, to 
“turn the whole institution of marriage upside down;”330 this could 
likewise shape behavior but for reasons rather different than the reasons 
typically thought to explain different-sex couples’ choices. State-based 
variation could also be important. The experience of couples in Iowa, 
where the state supreme court decision mandating gay marriage led to a 
significant backlash and the unseating of several justices,
331
 might differ 
from the experience of couples in Massachusetts, where most reports 
suggest gay marriage has been relatively uncontroversial and spurred 
greater acceptance of gay families.
332
  
Beyond considerations that relate particularly to legalization of 
marriage, other factors discussed above, such as race, class, duration of 
couples’ relationships, biological relationships to children, nature of 
employment, etc., may all play a role in couples’ decision-making. Despite 
the complexity posed by such potentially confounding variables, the fact 
that same-sex marriages now exist in a growing number of jurisdictions 
offers a significant, and potentially time-limited, opportunity to probe the 
relative significance of sex, gender, and the law of marriage.  
 
 
 328. My thanks to Cary Franklin and to Suzanna Walters for conversations that helped me 
articulate these points. 
 329. This is a challenge that has long faced researchers studying different-sex couples. See supra 
note 152 and accompanying text. With respect to gay couples, comparisons between states that have 
legalized marriage and those that have not might be able to correct in part for this.  
 330. See Chambers, supra note 229 (quoting Jack Baker, a plaintiff in the first significant same-
sex marriage case litigated in this country). 
 331. See A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 
2010, at A1. 
 332. See, e.g., Final Report of the N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMMISSION, THE LEGAL, MEDICAL, 
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF NEW JERSEY’S CIVIL UNION LAW 20–24 (2008), available 
at http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcr/downloads/CURC-Final-Report-.pdf (discussing positive experience of 
legalization in Massachusetts and contrasting that to New Jersey’s experience with civil unions).  
  
 
 
 
 
2012] MARRIAGE EQUATION 793 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION: EQUALITY RECONSIDERED 
Current proposals to address the imbalance in caretaking functions 
provided by men and women during marriage fall generally into two 
camps.
333
 The first camp argues that gender roles are so deeply entrenched 
in society that we need policies specifically designed (and potentially 
employing sex-specific requirements) to counter these norms and thus 
enforce a more equal sharing of responsibility between men and women.
334
 
The second approach, by contrast, suggests that gender roles are so deeply 
entrenched, or that they respond to actual biological or physiological 
differences between men and women, that rather than striving for an 
“equal” split of household and workplace responsibilities between men 
and women, we instead need to revalue the feminine contribution and 
make it easier for women to spend time out of the paid workforce, at least 
when their children are young.
335
 Notably, neither of these common 
approaches considers the effect that substantive marriage law may play in 
how couples make decisions. 
The marriage equation framework shows how the new reality of 
marriage rights for same-sex couples offers the opportunity to approach 
these questions from a fresh perspective. Carefully designed quantitative 
or qualitative research comparing same-sex and different-sex married 
couples can play a central role in teasing out the relative importance of 
sex, gender norms, and the laws and benefits of marriage. It will be many 
years before researchers have a sufficient body of data and analysis of 
such data to make credible statements regarding general patterns. That 
said, broadly speaking, two potential findings could emerge. One is that, 
notwithstanding marriage, same-sex couples continue to share 
responsibilities on the home and work front relatively equally. This would 
suggest that gender is the key factor in different-sex couples’ 
specialization and that current reform efforts centered on reshaping or 
accommodating gender norms are the appropriate mechanism to address 
the ongoing imbalance.  
 
 
 333. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 226, at 573–74 (summarizing the “two most prominent 
perspectives”); WILLIAMS, supra note 147, at 226–30 (similar).  
 334. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 186, at 385 (suggesting that to claim custody a parent would need 
to show a pre-existing “significant (defined in terms of time) relationship” with his or her child); 
Selmi, supra note 190, at 712–13, 770–81 (suggesting mandatory paternity leave or rewards for 
employers that adopt policies that successfully increase paternity leave).  
 335. See, e.g., Suk, supra note 227, at 53 (arguing that if most mothers desire to take a maternity 
leave, then a “paternalistic” policy that mandates such a leave protects the interests of the majority 
against “superwomen” who would return to work immediately). 
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The other potential result is that upon being permitted to marry—
particularly if DOMA is repealed or overturned—same-sex couples will 
move away from sharing responsibilities for children and housework 
relatively equally and towards specialization. This would suggest that the 
law and social significance of marriage is comparatively more important 
than sex or gender in encouraging specialization in couples. Such findings 
could expose a disconnect in a structure of marriage law that encourages 
specialization during marriage but that, upon divorce, treats such 
specialization as an individual choice for which the dependent spouse 
must bear the consequences. If one embraces a normative ideal of 
marriage as a partnership in which spouses equally share responsibilities 
for breadwinning and caretaking, this finding would suggest that reforms 
should focus on modifying, or, more provocatively, dismantling the 
substantive law and benefits that flow from marriage itself.
336
  
Some might argue, however, that the advent of same-sex marriage also 
invites reconsideration of the normative vision of equality within 
marriage. Perhaps, rather than idealizing a marriage in which both spouses 
equally share breadwinning and caregiving responsibilities, it is 
appropriate to accept and expect a certain level of specialization in many 
marriages. This could call for more flexible workplace policies to 
accommodate caregiving in conjunction with paid work and more robust 
protections for a spouse who does such caregiving in the event of divorce. 
In the past, it would have been almost impossible to disaggregate such a 
statement from gender-based assumptions regarding which spouse would 
play the caretaking role. And some policymakers and theorists would 
likely reject such a vision of equality categorically because they assume 
that it would perpetuate the inferiority and subordination of women. This 
is a valid concern. Domestic roles are still little valued in our society and 
are still largely filled by women. However, policies crafted today or in the 
future to accommodate caregiving within families are necessarily different 
from the sex-specific responsibilities of wives that they replace. The 
simple reality of same-sex married couples, as well as the relatively small 
but growing number of different-sex couples in which it is the husband, 
rather than the wife, who drops out of or minimizes participation in the 
paid workplace, changes the story. 
 
 
 336. See, e.g., FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 29 (advocating allocation of state 
benefits on the basis of caretaker-dependent relationships rather than marital relationships). 
 
